

Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

APRIL-JUNE 1994
PB 34-94-2



ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Unofficial Intelligence Center Organizational Listing

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This list is not all inclusive.

Writers of the Year 1993 and Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce the 1993 winners of the Writer of the Year contest. **Writer of the Year:** LTC Robert E. Hallagan, "An Introduction to our Intelligence Branch Concept," Jan-Mar 1993. **Runner-up:** CPT Shawn E. Weed, "Air IPB and the BCTP Experience," Apr-Jun 1993. **Honorable Mentions:** CPT Victor J. Castrillo, "Contributions, Shortcomings, and Lessons Learned from U.S. MI Training/Advisory in El Salvador," Oct-Dec 1993; and MAJ Stuart E. Deakin and SFCs Jerry Weed, Larry Brock, Rudy Maggay, and Barry Monson, "EW Tactics: Massing Electronic Bullets," Jul-Sep 1993.

CPT Gregory S. Weaver has been chosen **Writer of the Quarter (Apr-Jun 1994)** for his article, "An Example of Tactical Tailoring and their Force Projection Principles."

Congratulations to all of the winners, and thanks to all of our authors for their fine articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is your contribution that makes MIPB the professional forum for Military Intelligence.

The Army Military Intelligence Ball

LTC Owens, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters DA and MG Menoher, Commanding General, INSCOM invite all active and retired military personnel, DA civilians, and their guests to attend the 19th annual Army Military Intelligence Ball. Additionally friends of the Army intelligence community are invited to attend and join in the camaraderie. This year's ball will be held the evening of September 24, 1994 at the Radisson Plaza Hotel at Mark Center, Alexandria, VA. Attendance is limited, with tickets available on a first come first served basis. Group seating is available on request. For reservations, ticket price, or other information contact either LTC East at DSN 225-1758 or Commercial 703-695-1758 or CPT Carney at DSN 227-3398 or Commercial 703-607-3398.

Thanks

MIPB gratefully acknowledges Sergeant First Class Michael C. Taylor and Major Patrick M. Madden for their reference material and expertise on certain topics.

We appreciate your help and encourage others to participate in the production of MIPB. You can do this by providing original photographs and illustrations, especially of new equipment being used for the first time. This will help to ensure we display the most current equipment in MIPB and in the new field manuals. Please identify the equipment shown and provide the photographer's name.

We are also interested in developing a series on these topics: intelligence simulations, joint operations, and information warfare. However, articles and photos on any MI topic are welcome.

Answering Machine

MIPB now uses an answering machine. The answering machine is provided for messages 24 hours a day or for routine subscription transactions. Commercial 602-533-6435, DSN 821-6435. These numbers will change sometime near the start of the 1st Quarter, FY 95.

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Professional Bulletin



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VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John F. Stewart, Jr.

Operation Desert Capture II (ODC II) was conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) during rotation 94-07 (March and April 1994). ODC II implemented the MI doctrine described in **FM 100-5, Operations** and **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**. While the operational success of the exercise was high, the best thing to come out of ODC II was a clear focus as to where we need to go to make the intelligence system of tomorrow a reality today.

ODC II was the second in a series of exercises used to validate the concept that the Commander Drives Intelligence. The first experiment, ODC I, was held at the NTC in December 1992. It involved the use of multiple collection sensors focused on a brigade's rotation, and validated the principles of synchronization, broadcast intelligence, split-based operations, and tactical tailoring. These key concepts have reshaped how we will think of intelligence in the future.

A number of units were involved in ODC II. The primary maneuver element was the 3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mech) which consisted of Task Force 2-18, Task Force 1-70 Armor (194th Infantry Brigade), and Task Force 3-9 Infantry. III Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, 24th ID(M), INSCOM, and CENTCOM sent support elements to assist in intelligence collection and processing. Our sister services and many national agencies supported the exercise with intelligence sensors and processors.

"Intelligence and what it brings to future battlefields will be important to us...having the best will give us the edge in the Information War Age...that edge is critical and we must sharpen it even more."

—General Gordon Sullivan
Army Chief of Staff

The Battle Command Battle Lab (Huachuca) planned and executed the synchronization of national, theater, and tactical collectors to support the maneuver elements. The 24th ID(M) command and control elements performed mission management and processed and disseminated intelligence. The 24th ID(M) deployed an Analysis and Control Element (ACE[-]) which provided direct intelligence interface with the 3d Brigade and the 24th Aviation Brigade.

The XVIII Airborne Corps and INSCOM estab-

lished a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) to—

- ☐ Provide direct interface to the 24th ID(M) ACE(-).
- ☐ Control corps collection assets.
- ☐ Provide a conduit for theater and national assets.

ODC II moved forward from ODC I by employing the principles of our MI Concept, while testing the main principle that the Commander Drives Intelligence. The hypotheses developed are that—

- ☐ Intelligence moves from the top down and the bottom up.
- ☐ Intelligence can be pulled on the move.
- ☐ Intelligence supports the commander during split-based operations.
- ☐ Intelligence must be focused downwardly.

The experiment required an entire intelligence structure created from both theater and national collectors, as well as tactical collection systems, processors, and soldiers.


"It (intelligence) gives us the ability to rapidly transmit information quickly to where it is needed...without it the (combat) commanders will be blind...what is being done will give them (commanders) a wider range of options."

—General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

ODC II was a great success, progressing toward fulfillment of the intelligence principles. Naturally, work still needs to be done in bringing each principle to full capability. The greatest success of the exercise, for intelligence, was in our ability to now see where we have to go as we move toward the 21st century.

Split-based operations were successful. To demonstrate that intelligence support would not be degraded during split-based operations, 24th ID(M), INSCOM, and XVIII Airborne Corps established the ACE-DISE link. The ACE(-) and DISE also replicated other IEW elements that would deploy before the main command post. The deployed elements developed all of the intelligence products in support of the brigade and battalion commanders planning and executing their missions.

Success was also realized in focusing intelli-



gence downwardly. Common digitized SPOT reports were tested using theater and national intelligence products. The focus on intelligence support to the tactical level resulted in fusion of theater and national intelligence with echelon corps and below intelligence.

Pulling intelligence on the move proved to be a tough problem. Although the capability exists, it is still limited by technology and interoperability. Digitized data was sent to the 3d Brigade and Task Force 1-70 from the ACE(-), but large data files could not be passed. We are pursuing a new way to pull intelligence that reduces the load on communications.

Bottom-up and top-down movement of intelligence was demonstrated during ODC II. The tactical units digitized the push-to-talk SALUTE report with the intra-vehicular information system (IVIS). These reports were sent to the Battle Command Vehicle where personnel integrated them into the common enemy picture. The ACE(-) and DISE were also successful at developing a common enemy pic-

ture, which was disseminated electronically using the ASAS workstation. As further information was required, the units pulled electronically from the appropriate data bases. Our efforts in this area are still in the early stages; however, with emerging technology, and time to train our young soldiers on that technology, we will certainly move ahead.

The hypotheses that intelligence can be moved from bottom up and top down, pulled on the move, conducted split based, and focused down were definitely proven during ODC II. We were able to get accurate near-real-time intelligence down to the brigade and battalion. The Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence systems took a giant step forward. It was also shown that the future really lies in the commander driving intelligence. The experiment successfully pointed out corrections in course and improvements in technology needed to bring all of these intelligence principles together for the Army of the future. Work continues. ODC II represented a very positive step in a series leading to improved, commander driven intelligence.

by Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall

I have noticed an ever-increasing number of entries on military police blotters, varying from traffic violations to hard-core crimes. As NCO leaders, we must take a firm stand to reverse this trend. We must communicate the standards so that every soldier and family member understands the rules and regulations governing the military lifestyle.

Senior NCOs are directly responsible for all the good things that their soldiers do. Conversely, they are also accountable for their soldiers' disciplinary problems. Good leaders mentor their soldiers in every aspect of training and leadership. This process results in soldiers who focus on accomplishing the mission instead of destroying property or harming other soldiers.

There are various leadership styles, and each leader must choose the one that is compatible with his or her personality. Some leaders change styles depending on the rank of the soldier they are counseling. Unfortunately, some leaders use the same style with every soldier; those leaders are not usually as successful as leaders who use a more flexible approach.


Leadership is defined in FM 22-100, Military

Leadership, as "the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation." There are four leadership factors: the led, the leader, the situation, and communications. The one factor that is always present, and the one that is most important, is communications. If you cannot articulate your requirements to your subordinates, peers, and in some cases, superiors, you stand little chance of being a successful leader.

Counseling is a key element in establishing discipline. The Army requires leaders to counsel soldiers on their performance monthly; but personal counseling should be done as often as necessary. These sessions should teach the difference between good and bad and right and wrong. This kind of counseling helps soldiers gain self-control so they can obey the rules. Counseling is a positive step designed to enhance a soldier's performance. Praising soldiers who do a good job encourages them to continue doing a good job. Correcting soldiers who have problems motivates them to do better, or at least provides documentation that may be needed for any

(Continued on page 48)

FROM THE EDITOR



"We need to stay out front in readiness to conduct force projection operations."

—Major General John F. Stewart, Jr.

Force projection operations present a significant challenge to us — the requirement to maintain intelligence readiness. This requirement is clearly illustrated in the first two articles in this issue: "Army Intelligence Split-Based Operations" and "An Example of Tactical Tailoring and Other Force Projection Principles."

MI personnel, units, and organizations must ensure they train and organize as they will fight. This means training as part of a force projection operation and taking full advantage of every training exercise (especially at the combat training centers). We must take maximum advantage of these exercises because they provide an opportunity to perform realistic and resource intensive training.

Furthermore, training, exercises, and contingency plans should reflect new doctrine, internal organization, and systems, even before those systems are fielded in that unit. We shouldn't divide ourselves into the "haves" and "have nots." The intelligence community would support a unit with many non-organic systems before a force projection operation occurred. For example, during Desert Storm units were supported by unmanned aerial vehicles, and TROJAN SPIRIT, among other systems.

Training must be focused on providing commanders with an intelligence force capable of supporting force projection operations. And, every opportunity must be taken to integrate realistic mission-oriented scenarios, processing, and communications into joint and combined arms training events.

—FM 34-1, *Intelligence And Electronic Warfare Operations*

Thank you to all of our authors for their contributions and patient assistance. These contributions have helped improve professionalism within the intelligence community. We continue to need feature articles, feedback, letters to the editor, and participants in the book review program. We specifically need articles concerning other service's intelligence systems and organizations and joint intelligence operations. MIPB will dedicate a future issue to joint intelligence.

Stephen B. Leader

LETTERS

To the Editor:

Mr. Peter Gardner, in his letter printed in your October-December 1993 issue, correctly points out that numerous laws, regulations, and policies exist to govern Department of Defense intelligence activities. In fact, they were created originally to address DOD intelligence activities undertaken in response to domestic civil disturbances such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, and to prohibit DOD from conducting any domestic intelligence activities, unless specifically approved. I am writing to elaborate on his point and to emphasize the responsibility incumbent upon all intelligence personnel to understand and follow intelligence oversight guidelines.

Intelligence oversight directives were created in response to public outcry against military intelligence investigations of political dissidents, an-

tiwar groups, religious organizations, civil rights organizations, and their leaders, during the 1960s—all done in support of civil disturbance military contingency plans, and all done at the behest of the Department of Justice. Nevertheless, in reaction to the outcry and to increasing congressional scrutiny of the intelligence community, President Ford issued **Executive Order 11905, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities**, in 1976 to control U.S. intelligence activities.

The current **Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities**, issued by President Reagan in 1981, permits DOD intelligence agencies to conduct intelligence activities that affect U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense.

DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of

DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons, which governs all DOD intelligence activities, contains the approved procedures. **Army Regulation 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities**, implements the procedures for Army intelligence.

These documents constitute the charter from which Army intelligence derives its authority to operate. Explicit in them is the requirement for each member of Army intelligence to be familiar with and to comply with all of the provisions and procedures.

I hope your readers will take time to reacquaint themselves with our intelligence oversight directives and their intelligence oversight responsibilities.

Charles A. Hawkins, Jr.
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.

(Continued on page 38)

Army Intelligence Split-Based Operations

by Major Patrick M. Madden and
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hallagan

Today's MI mission requires the capability to rapidly deploy to support a force projection commander anywhere in the world against any enemy. To support the commander, the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) must be light, mobile, and capable of providing precise intelligence. Split-based operations help us meet this mission requirement.

The rapid introduction of forces requires continuous intelligence, especially during early deployment.
—FM 100-5, Operations

Split-based intelligence operations reduce the in-theater footprint and airlift requirements. They provide for efficient, effective, tailorable, and flexible intelligence support in multiple locations. This tenet relies on assured communications and automation which allow a large portion of intelligence management and processing to remain in an intelligence support base. The Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) plays a key role in this support.

DISE

The DISE is a small intelligence support team that brings together communications, automated intelligence fusion, and broadcast downlinks in a small package capable of deploying with Army early entry forces. However, the DISE is not a specific organization or quantity of equipment. It is a **tactically tailored** team that supports the early entry force S2/G2 and is **uniquely configured** based on the mission, threat, lift restrictions, and pre-positioned assets. The DISE may be formed from the organic assets of the early entry force (for example, the division analysis and control element [ACE]), the corps ACE, supporting echelons above corps (EAC) MI brigade, or a combination of all of these elements.

The DISE is part of the core, initial entry intelligence support which can be expanded to a full ACE

as lodgment operations are completed or disbanded once the mission is accomplished. This flexible organization can be designed to support any type of ground force to include other services or allied/coalition forces. When deployed at theater or joint task force (JTF), the DISE complements the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) which normally is in direct support of the joint headquarters. The NIST (unlike the DISE) does not have an all-source intelligence fusion system or direct downlink access to theater sensors.

Key intelligence personnel and equipment must arrive in theater early. —FM 100-5, Operations

The mission of the DISE is to assist the early entry force S2/G2 in providing his commander accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence in support of the rapid introduction of U.S. forces. Successful execution of split-based operations is critical to the success of force projection operations. Through split-based operations, the DISE provides tactical commanders a link from their forward command and control (C2) element to an intelligence support base located outside the area of operations. This link provides the early entry commander vital access to multi-source Army and joint intelligence collection assets, processing systems, and data bases, allowing the DISE to "pull" specified intelligence.

The DISE is part of the forward MI element of split-based operations in direct support to the deployed Army commander and responds directly to his priority intelligence requirements. The S2/G2 staff and any initial collection systems are the other part of this forward MI element. The intelligence support base is the rearward element of split-based operations and provides processed and analyzed intelligence to the DISE.

A tailored suite of integrated computers and communication systems supports the DISE. Supporting hardware systems are all built around the Army All-

Source Analysis System (ASAS) and integrated with other Army and joint intelligence and communication capabilities. A support system configuration may range in size from "briefcases" to HMMWVs and is normally manned by 5 to 12 soldiers, respectively. The "briefcases" configuration is called the Mini-DISE (manportable) while the HMMWVs configuration is called the DISE (vehicular).

The Mini-DISE is designed to be manportable and airborne capable. This configuration consists of two to three briefcases containing an SHF or UHF SATCOM radio, a lap-top computer with ASAS/Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) software, and COMSEC equipment. The Mini-DISE performs two primary missions—providing en route, airborne intelligence to the early entry commander and providing assured intelligence communications until the lodgment has been secured and follow-on intelligence support (such as the DISE [vehicular] or the ACE) has arrived.

The Mini-DISE may then become part of the DISE (vehicular) or ACE, transition to support follow-on operations, or move to another location where it is needed. It is an excellent tool for liaison operations and support to mobile TOCs.

The DISE (vehicular) generally consists of one or two HMMWVs configured with communications shelters and one or two cargo HMMWVs based on mission requirements and air transport restrictions. A complete DISE could consist of ASAS, TROJAN SPIRIT (providing satellite communications to the Defense Data Network [DDN]), and a broadcast-downlink system. The downlink system could be the commander's tactical terminal (CTT), Joint STARS ground station module (GSM), or Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT). This robust configuration can interact with various tactical and theater systems such as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), and Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). The DISE must maintain the organic capability to conduct worldwide communications and to process information from its intelligence support base.


Once the DISE has deployed, tactics and techniques require it to support the organic intelligence staff of the initial assault. Depending on the operation, this could range from an Airborne Battalion S2 to a Marine Expeditionary Force G2. The DISE must work with the supported unit during both planning and executing operations to ensure the intelligence

support base is synchronized with the ground commander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

Through close coordination with the DISE, the intelligence support base provides analyzed intelligence and receives updates on the friendly situation. The parent or next higher unit ACE of the deployed DISE becomes the intelligence support base. Together, the early entry S2/G2, DISE, and intelligence support base ensure the Intelligence BOS stays focused on the needs of the deployed commander and allows him to "pull" intelligence based on their actual needs.

The Big Picture

Split-based operations place a premium on flexibility and interoperability. They also require that the links between EAC and echelons corps and below (ECB) are thoroughly planned and routinely exercised in peacetime. The intelligence support base operates under the direction of the appropriate G2/J2. It has adequate automation, communications capacity, and personnel to provide continuous collection, processing, and reporting management. The intelligence support base serves as the conduit for the DISE to request, or "pull," specific intelligence products and reports, obtain status of collection, and "push" the intelligence picture from the lodgment back to the Army Forces headquarters (ARFOR) and JTF commanders.



1. Organizations. The future of Army intelligence support to force projection and split-based operations is embodied within intelligence units organized in accordance with the approved Force Design Update.

Approximately a third of the Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center (ITAC) analysts (to include imagery analysts) transfer to the control of the U.S.

Army Forces Command. This provides significant "value added" to intelligence support in crisis and warfighting support to early entry forces from the U.S., especially if the capability is routinely used and exercised during peacetime.

The Army's Intelligence Support Element (ISE) from the EAC brigade contributes ground forces expertise to the JTF Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) on a task-organized basis. The DISE provides the connectivity between the S2/G2 and the JTF JIC to request intelligence information for the ARFOR commander.

The Corps Military Intelligence Support Element (CMISE), provided by the EAC brigade, is the "day-to-day" bridge between the corps and Army Service Component Command. They reinforce the organic analytical capability of the corps and directly support the DISE in coordination with the corps MI brigade.

Army Component Commands, corps, and divisions must continually practice (if not daily) the employment of all of these organizations (organic and supporting) during peacetime. Training to refine force tailoring procedures, force sequencing, communications connectivity, and habitual support relationships is critical. Maintaining habitual peacetime support relationships and access allows contingency units to pull from their "normal" intelligence sources and reduces the probability of intelligence shortfalls.

2. Collection, processing, and dissemination systems. ASAS is the Army's only automated intelligence "fusion tool." ASAS hosts JDISS software and is interoperable with the JWICS protocols and standards. This permits direct data exchange with other service, joint, and national data bases. ASAS is the centerpiece for intelligence processing, analysis, and reporting for the Army DISE which supports the ARFOR, joint force land component commander (JFLCC), or JTF headquarters.

All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)

ASAS provides automated intelligence and information management, to include interface data handling. It couples IEW sensors, preprocessors, the ASAS, and the Force Level Control System (FLCS) to meet time and accuracy requirements for decision support and command and control warfare (C²W) planning. It consists of evolutionary sets of hardware and software modules that perform: system operations and security management, communications processing and interfacing, intelligence processing and reporting, target identification and nomination, and collection management. The ASAS collateral enclave subsystem provides automated intelligence support to the G2 plans and operations elements and operates the technical control portion of the Information Warfare (IW) C² node of Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS). It provides current IEW and enemy situation information to the FLCS data base for access and use by other ATCCS/FLCS users.

There are a variety of single- and multi-source processors and pre-processors in the Army intelli-

gence inventory which the support base can use. All are engineered to interoperate with other systems:

- ☐ **Digital Topographic Support System, Block II.** Creates, updates, and stores digital multi-spectral terrain products.
- ☐ **Imagery Exploitation System.** Receives, exploits, and disseminates digital imagery.
- ☐ **Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator.** An advanced development, mobile synthetic aperture radar processor.
- ☐ **Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal.** A HMMWV-mounted Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) system that receives and integrates broadcast signals intelligence (SIGINT) (Tactical Information Broadcast Service [TIBS], Tactical Related Applications [TRAP], and Tactical Data Information Exchange System [TADIX-B] formatted transmissions) with secondary imagery transmissions. This could be part of a DISE (vehicular).
- ☐ **Single-Source Processor SIGINT.** An EAC mobile system that processes, correlates, and forwards reports on COMINT and ELINT.
- ☐ **Electronic Processing and Dissemination System.** A corps, mobile system that receives, processes, correlates and integrates, and forwards SIGINT reports.
- ☐ **Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS/GSM Block II).** Receives, analyzes, and displays Joint STARS broadcast data. Block II product improvement to the CGS adds unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), secondary imagery, Guardrail, TIBS, and TRAP broadcast. Joint STARS CGS will be a fully mobile targeting, battle management, and surveillance system. This could be part of a DISE (vehicular).
- ☐ **Commander's Tactical Terminal/Hybrid.** An anti-jam, readily transportable COMINT and ELINT tasking and reporting radio for the near-real-time dissemination of intelligence. Up to 100 field addresses can be selected for dissemination. This should be part of a DISE.
- ☐ **TROJAN SPIRIT II.** A satellite communications terminal which provides assured access for intelligence processing and dissemination systems, particularly in split-based operations. This should be part of a DISE (vehicular).
- Integrated Meteorological System.** A mobile, tactical system that receives, processes and disseminates weather data. IMETS receives weather data from satellites, USAF theater forecast units, USAF Global Weather Central, and local sensors.

Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS/GSM BLK II)

Joint STARS GSM BLK II (CGS) is a product improvement of the GSM BLK I. It will include all GSM BLK I functionality in three mobility/survivability configurations: heavy, medium, and light. CGS/GSM BLK II will be able to receive, correlate, manipulate, display, store, and disseminate imagery to include secondary imagery from national and theater sensors. The CGS will operate at secret collateral level. It will interface with ATCCS and brigade and below command and control (B^2C^2) to provide tactical commanders and battle staffs at ECB a battlefield status-at-a-glance. CGS operations on the move will be supported by a robust suite of communications devices that include SATCOM, Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR), and CTT. The system will facilitate the command and staff battle team through the use of wargaming, IPB, asset management, and other tactical IEW and targeting working aids. It will provide the force with a fully scalable, tailorable, mobile, and responsive intelligence data processing capability to satisfy operational and tactical requirements.

Commander's Tactical Terminal/Hybrid (CTT-H: ANUSC-55)

The CTT-H provides simultaneous full-duplex (FDX) data and half-duplex (HDX) voice communications between ground processing facilities (the USAF Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance System [CARS] and the Army GRCS intelligence processing facility [IPF]) and tactical field units in Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System (TRIXS) net. The CTT-H also provides the commander access to theater and national assets through TIBS and TRAP/TADIXS broadcast. The CTT-H provides the capability for selected Army and Air Force airborne collection systems to transmit (on a dedicated basis) perishable intelligence to deep, close, and rear operations: weapon, aviation, air defense, and intelligence systems at all echelons.

TROJAN SPIRIT II (AN/TSQ-190[V])

This system consists of secure voice, data, facsimile, video, and secondary imagery dissemination capabilities. The system will receive, display, and transmit digital imagery, weather, and terrain: products, templates, graphics, and text between CONUS/OCONUS bases and deployed forces. Connectivity is provided through the Fort Belvoir TROJAN switching center which currently connects TROJAN systems at various U.S. bases with front-end arrays located worldwide. The TROJAN SPIRIT II combines this network with mobile switch extensions to offer a worldwide, forward-deployed, quick-reaction reporting and analysis link. The terminal can provide up to 14 circuits (10 SCI/4 collateral) using variable baud rates from 4.8 to 512 kbps per channel and will operate on C, Ku, or X frequency bands. Validated requirements for the SPIRIT II system include DSNET I/III, MSE, and Tactical Packet Network (TPN) interfaces, as well as LAN connectivity. It is intended to augment EAC and ECB in-theater communications. Other communications paths can be used such as: MSE/TRITAC (tri-service tactical communications system), SHF SATCOM, International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), HF radio, commercial telephone, or landline. There are trade-offs between bandwidth (throughput), access to the communications channel, and the ability to work off local or wide area networks. The parent command must identify as early as possible the types, sizes, and connectivity requirements for communications. The G2/J2 and G6/J6 ensure the proper frequencies, communications protocols, encryption devices, and procedures are all used together.

3. Information systems. Access to the continually evolving DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS, to include JWICS and JDISS), coupled with commercial-leased satellite communications, gives the DISE a robust and flexible capability. DODIIS defines the standards and protocols. JWICS is the primary means of delivery over military

or commercial satellite. JDISS is the primary means of display of fused intelligence to the DISE. The primary DISE intelligence satellite communications backbone is the SCI-level Defense Secure Network-3 (DSNET-3) portion of the DDN. TROJAN SPIRIT, which has JWICS, provides a mobile, rapidly deployable, and assured path that is particularly valuable in the early entry stages of operations. TROJAN SPIRIT and the communications network of TROJAN also provide a complementary path as the operation matures, linking Army users with other services, joint headquarters, and the support base. The ASAS local area network (LAN), hosting JDISS software, completes the information architecture.

4. Training and leader development. Training in this environment requires integration of battle command, intelligence, communications, and logistic systems so commanders and their support teams are trained consistently (whether in "live" or simulated exercises). The nature of force projection operations requires commanders to redefine intelligence readiness. MI must develop broad knowledge on priority contingency areas, update associated data bases daily, and be prepared to surge in support of emerging missions. Commanders and G2s must direct the intelligence effort daily to ensure data bases are adequate before a crisis to support contingency planning and execution.

Summary

The Intelligence Center is firmly establishing the following doctrinal tenets:

- ☐ Split-based operations are the normal, doctrinal means of intelligence support to force projection operations, and must have assured communications.
- ☐ The DISE is an essential part of the forward MI element in direct support of the Army or JTF early entry commander.
- ☐ The parent unit ACE provides the core of the DISE; and the DISE is tactically tailored based upon METT-T.
- ☐ The size and capability of follow-on IEW assets will be dictated by the situation and commander's intent.
- ☐ The commander drives intelligence.

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An Example of Tactical Tailoring and Other Force Projection Principles



by Captain Gregory Scott Weaver

Editor's Note: Captain Weaver's article is "a snapshot in time," describing contingency planning by the 501st MI Battalion from January to June 1993. Many of the battalion's plans have changed with time.

In February 1993, the United States government modified its Balkans policy to include support for the Vance-Owens Peace Plan (VOPP) which was brokered by the United Nations. Assuming that United States support might include the commitment of ground forces, the 501st MI Battalion, 1st Armored Division, began planning contingency peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We in the battalion's technical control and analysis element (TCAE) focused on signals intelligence (SIGINT) operational planning. The battalion's experiences in tactically tailoring an intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) package for deployment illustrate several emerging concepts in intelligence doctrine for force projection operations. **Ultimately, our planning demonstrated that MI equipment and doctrine, with some modifications, can meet the requirements of operations other than war.**

According to the latest draft of the Army's capstone intelligence manual, FM 34-1, **Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, tactical tailoring "is the process used to determine what is the correct mix and sequence of deploying units." Tactical tailoring is one of the five principles undergirding IEW support to force projection operations. The other four are: the commander drives intelligence, intelligence synchronization, split-based operations, and broadcast dissemination.

Tactically tailoring IEW support for force projection operations includes, among other things, assessing the IEW requirements of the mission and

deploying an appropriate IEW package to support that mission. To help explain how our battalion developed its plan to tactically tailor the SIGINT component of an IEW contingency package, I will use an analysis of the METT-T factors:

- ☐ Mission.
- ☐ Enemy (or threat).
- ☐ Terrain and weather.
- ☐ Troops (and other assets).
- ☐ Time available.

The Mission

The battalion's mission would have depended on the overall political goals and military mission of the peace plan. Politically, the VOPP would divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 ethnic areas and establish a central government with limited federal powers, had the belligerents signed the plan and the U.N. ratified it. Militarily, the plan would establish a framework for—

- ☐ A cease-fire.
- ☐ Withdrawals from lines of confrontation.
- ☐ Disengagement of heavy weapons.
- ☐ The opening of roads.
- ☐ Restoration of water and power supplies.

U.N. diplomats envisioned the deployment of a large international force almost immediately after the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

The military provisions of VOPP provided clues to the intelligence requirements a commander might establish. The first stage of force projection—entry operations—normally requires that force protection and situation development dominate intelligence collection. This concept would have been especially true in our case. If international military forces were inserted soon after the cease-fire, those forces would fly or sail into areas where belligerent forces with heavy weapons were still in proximity. The potential for mishaps would be enormous.

To conduct force protection, commanders need information on the status and location of belligerent forces near possible insertion points. Furthermore, to conduct situation development, commanders need information on the status of those and other forces as the belligerents disengage and withdraw in accordance with the peace plan.

Perhaps most critical to the long-term success of the plan would be to ensure safe transit along the roads. Friendly forces would have to open the roads and patrol them to maintain their security. Once they were opened, it would be politically important to make sure that the belligerents could freely travel along the routes.

In partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 ethnic areas, the VOPP often separated a region with one ethnic group from a second region with fellow members by a third region controlled by their ethnic rivals. For example, the Serbs controlled a region in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina and another in the northwest, with belligerents controlling territory in between. Seizing direct control of the corridor between the two regions has been a major Serb objective during the conflict. If the Serbs were to remain peaceful, U.N. military forces would have to ensure unhindered transit across that corridor; thus, intelligence support to maintain the security of belligerent and friendly convoys would be critical.

The Enemy

In these missions, who would be the threat? Although the three major factions—Serbs, Croats, and Moslems—would have to agree to the VOPP before the plan would be executed, each faction has numerous sub-elements. Regular armies and irregular forces of every type—paramilitary forces, partisan groups, and even local mafia-type gangs—have participated in the conflict. Countless cease-fires failed because a sub-faction violated the latest agreement. "Loose cannons" have complicated matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina over and over again; we could expect them to complicate peace enforcement operations also. Besides a renunciation of the plan by one of the main factions, we planned for two worst case incidents:

- ☐ An outright attack on a base camp by a renegade faction.
- ☐ An attack on a friendly or belligerent convoy.

However, the most likely problem would be belligerents trying to re-establish the numerous checkpoints along important roads.

Finally, these belligerent groups were armed with many different weapons. They ranged from portable mortars and early Cold-War Soviet tanks to a few self-propelled howitzers and the latest domestically produced versions of modern Soviet tanks. This complex threat was quite different from the Cold-War Soviet threat with familiar order of battle charts.

Terrain and Weather

We would have to conduct our contingency operation against these possible threats on remarkably

rugged terrain under extreme weather conditions. Of all the former Yugoslavian republics, only tiny Montenegro is more mountainous than Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nearly all of Bosnia-Herzegovina is within the interior highlands region, an area characterized by mountains and hills, barren stretches of steep ridges, deep ravines, and basins and valleys. The road network we would have to clear and keep open featured many easily interdicted bridges and tunnels. To further complicate matters, winter would bring cold and snow to the mountains.

Troops

The battalion would deploy with two organic SIGINT companies in addition to command and control (C²) elements. The line company soldiers operated—


- ☐ AN/TRQ-30 intercept systems.
- ☐ AN/TLQ-17, TRAFFICJAM jamming systems.
- ☐ AN/TRQ-32, TEAMMATE and AN/TSQ-138, TRAILBLAZER direction finding (DF) systems.

C² assets included—

- ☐ The Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC), serving as the battalion's communications node for automated message traffic.
- ☐ The Tiger System, normally used to relay automated messages between the TCAC and the TRQ-32s and TRAILBLAZERS.
- ☐ Automated data processing equipment, loaded with the SIGINT portion of the All-Source Analysis System software.

According to doctrine, the division habitually placed the aviation brigade's QUICKFIX helicopters under the operational control of the battalion. Our battalion had coordinated with the aviation brigade to support QUICKFIX operations.

The battalion also considered that corps and echelons above corps (EAC) assets might be avail-



able to augment our efforts. The tactical exploitation battalion in the corps MI brigade had TRQ-32s,

while the MI company in the 11th ACR had TRQ-32s and TLQ-17s. PRD-12 Manpack Interceptors were just coming into the Army inventory, and other capable lightweight interceptors and jammers were available commercially. In addition, several USAREUR units owned Warrior automated systems, and we expected to receive a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) (which included TROJAN SPIRIT) that would provide access to EAC and national intelligence.

Finally, the battalion looked at how higher elements would support us if they tailored an Army Force (ARFOR) intelligence package in the area of operations (AO). The corps MI brigade could fly GUARDRAIL Common Sensor to intercept and locate SIGINT transmissions. The corps' electronic intelligence processing and dissemination system could provide access to higher-level radar intercepts, as well as other information. Additional higher-level SIGINT might be available from the 204th MI Brigade (EAC).

Time Available

The most difficult METT-T factor for us to weigh was the last one—time available. How much time would we have to plan and train? If all three belligerents agreed to VOPP, if the U.N. ratified the agreement, and if the United States decided to back the plan with ground forces, we might have to deploy on short notice. All three were big "ifs." However, prudence demanded we consider that, despite our plans, our force package might be limited to organic assets on-hand. Of course, training needed to begin immediately.

Concept of Operations

Considering the METT-T factors, the battalion developed its concept of—

- ☐ What we would deploy.
- ☐ When these assets would deploy.
- ☐ How we would operate.

Unfortunately, a big disadvantage with both the TRQ-32 and TRAILBLAZER systems is their inability to conduct long-range DF in mountainous terrain. Also, our battalion decided not to transport the TRAILBLAZERS because of their size and weight.

To get long-range DF, we would have to rely on

airborne platforms. That would involve GUARDRAIL and joint assets from higher level intelligence units. In terms of the division's organic systems, that would involve QUICKFIX. Seemingly a capable system, QUICKFIX has frequently disappointed us. If we were to use the system to its fullest, we would have to improve our training in all areas: mission management, crypto and frequency management, basic language, and reporting skills. Also, we would have to use standard FM communications for the tasking and reporting link with QUICKFIX since we did not plan to deploy the TRAILBLAZERS. Until the Army fields QUICKFIX II sometime in the future, QUICKFIX can only send automated reports via TRAILBLAZER.


While the terrain limited ground-based DF, ground-based intercept was still viable. The TRQ-32, mounted on a commercial utility cargo vehicle (CUCV), would be light enough to deploy by C-130; several could arrive early in the airflow. As long as the system operated as we expected, remaining at collection sites in or near base camps for long periods, the CUCV's weaknesses would not be a factor.

We assumed that friendly forces would have to operate away from base camps, off roads, and in the mountains. This would require the capability to support dismounted operations in difficult terrain. Since the battalion's TRQ-30s were old and unreliable, the battalion requested the new PRD-12.

Similarly, the TRQ-32 could not provide effective convoy secu-

rity. The battalion commander believed that a bounding technique was impractical and wanted to be able to escort convoys with an intercept-on-the-move system. He also wanted a convoy to have the capability to intercept the transmissions of an ambush-force talking over walkie-talkies on a frequency range the TRQ-32s could not intercept. To provide this capability, the battalion requested Bearcat Scanners for the TRQ-32s.

The positions of our systems would depend on the friendly scheme of maneuver. The reality of airlift priority would probably prohibit us from sending organic systems with the Initial Entry Force. The initial entry phase of a force projection operation typically requires a strong multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) presence to perform force protection. Therefore, the battalion planned to devote most of its small share of airlift to MDCI and human intelligence assets. We could initially afford to send only



a very small slice of the TCAE, which would serve as the SIGINT component of a mini-Analysis and Control Element (mini-ACE). They would rely on the mini-DISE's communications package to pull SIGINT reports from higher intelligence units.

The initial entry phase of a force projection operation typically requires a strong multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) presence to perform force protection.

The Nature of Force Projection Operations

To make decisions concerning the battalion's initial entry, we considered two important points concerning intelligence in force projection operations:

- ☐ According to draft FM 34-1, "tactical[ly] tailoring IEW support means...deploying an IEW package which is portable, logistically sustainable, and sufficient to conduct operations for the short term." Our small SIGINT slice was deployable and sustainable because of its size. Despite its small size, the mini-ACE and mini-DISE made the SIGINT slice sufficient for short-term operations.
- ☐ "In force projection, tactical intelligence comes from the top down...until organic tactical intelligence elements are engaged." That is especially true "during initial entry operations, [as] EAC organizations provide the major intelligence support in a 'push' mode."

Editor's Note: The revised final draft of FM 34-1 (March 1994) stresses that the supported unit should pull intelligence from higher level intelligence units.

We expected that, as the deployment progressed, the ARFOR would position its subordinate maneuver elements in depth throughout the AO. Once positioned, we expected the main headquarters for those subordinate forces would be located in static camps near the headquarters of belligerent forces. From base camps, they would deploy patrols, and exercise C² over other operations. Finally, because of the great distances involved, we anticipated that the ARFOR would decentralize control of many of its operations.

Decentralizing control of maneuver elements would force the battalion to decentralize its own ground-based assets. The ARFOR's "front" would include a huge area and would be oriented 360 degrees. This would be too large an area to maintain the battalion's ground-based assets in general support. The battalion would task organize all organic

and attached SIGINT assets into direct support (DS) companies headquartered with the subordinate maneuver elements.

This, in turn, forced us to radically change our C² structure. The collection and jamming platoon operations center (POC) normally exercises C² over the DS company's SIGINT assets. The battalion expected USAREUR to augment it with additional SIGINT systems. In turn, the battalion would attach those systems to the DS companies. The tables of organization and equipment require six SIGINT soldiers to staff the transcription and analysis team that forms the POC's core; they would need to be augmented so they could C² additional systems. To address this, the battalion commander decided to transform the POCs into mini-TCAEs by attaching soldiers from the TCAE. The remainder of the TCAE, no larger than the augmented POCs, would combine with G2 elements to form part of the mini-ACE.

A radical departure from Cold-War IEW doctrine, the battalion's plans were feasible because of the sophisticated, long-haul communications systems now available to Army intelligence. Just as the overall intelligence effort would rely on split-based operations with EAC elements providing downwardly focused intelligence to us in the AO, we were split-basing our SIGINT technical control and analysis operations. Realistically, despite the communications assets we would supply to the DS companies, we could not expect to maintain perfect communications all the time.

By augmenting the POCs, supplying them with down links (such as the commander's tactical terminal), and ensuring they had access to the Warrior automated system, the battalion enabled the DS companies to conduct autonomous intelligence operations if communications failed. When necessary and if authorized, they could exercise a limited degree of "skip-echelon" flexibility, bypassing us and interacting directly with higher level units.

In conclusion, as the battalion tailored its SIGINT support package to accommodate METT-T factors, we found we would need to deploy with a force very different from what we were used to in terms of equipment mixes, organization, and C². Nevertheless, as our experiences bear out, current MI equipment and emerging doctrine do provide the flexibility required for MI units to meet the changing and demanding challenges of a force projection Army.

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Imagery Intelligence

by Captain Dan Smith, USAR

It is critical that commanders and soldiers "see the battlefield," especially if the force is CONUS-based and its area of operations is overseas, as in force projection operations. Imagery from various sensors and platforms can provide "an eye" on an operational area or a specific target.

This article provides an overview of imagery intelligence (IMINT), and how imagery can be used to support intelligence, operational planning, and tactical operations. The purpose is not to teach the reader imagery analysis skills but simply to provide a basic appreciation of imagery.

To understand imagery you must be familiar with the basic definitions, what types of sensors and spatial/spectral resolution are available, and what platforms are available.

Basic Definitions

Following are the definitions of common imagery terms:

1. **IMINT** is the evaluated and collated information obtained through imagery analysis.

2. **Imagery analysis** is the detection, recognition, identification, or technical analysis of objects, activities, and terrain represented on imagery.

- ☐ **Detection** is the discovery of an object without positive recognition of the object.
- ☐ **Recognition** is determining an activity or object by type, and identifying it as friendly or

hostile. An example of object recognition would be distinguishing between trucks and tanks. **Image 1**, from a Navy F-14, reveals a number of trucks and armored vehicles in the U.N. motor vehicle park.

Imagery in these two categories usually covers large areas and provides a synoptic view of the area of operations. It is useful when focusing collection requirements for other types of intelligence, higher resolution imagery, and initial operational analysis and planning. This type of imagery is sometimes referred to as low resolution (low-res) imagery.

- ☐ **Identification** is the ability to discriminate between objects within a type or class. For example telling the difference between an Abrams M1 and a Russian T-80. This type of imagery is often referred to as medium resolution (mid-res) imagery. **Image 2** shows that there is a tank in the U.N. motor vehicle park.
- ☐ **Technical analysis** is the ability to precisely describe a feature, object, or component that is imaged. An example is a tank with a new laser range finder or reactive armor. This type of imagery is often referred to as high resolution (hi-res) imagery.

An excellent guide for determining what resolution is required is **NATO Standardization Agreement 3769, Minimum Ground Object Size**. It lists 20 types of targets and the resolution required to perform detection, recognition, identification, and technical analysis.

3. **Historical area coverage** is either reference imagery or actual imagery which depicts a country, region, operational area, or a named area of interest, over a period of months or years. For example, if you had imagery of Fort Chaffee before it became the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and imagery after several rotations, analysis would probably reveal changes such as new roads, trails, burned areas from accidental fires, and other evidence of military activity.

4. **Current coverage** is either references or actual imagery which depicts the areas described above, but may also include detailed imagery coverage of specific areas of operation, named areas of interest (NAIs), targeted areas of interest (TAIs), and targets.

The key factors are image quality (to identify and analyze the target or objective) and timeliness.



Timeliness becomes critical as requirements transition to support specific tactical operations.

To use imagery one must also know something about the human eye, the basic sensor types and platforms, and understand their advantages and limitations. The human eye is sensitive to visible light between 0.4 and 0.7 microns wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Imaging systems can operate in one or more wavelengths which the unassisted eye cannot perceive.

Types of Sensors and Spatial/Spectral Resolution

Following is an explanation of the four most common sensors and their spatial/spectral resolution:

Electro-optical (EO) sensors and the older photographic sensors image in the visible light portion of the spectrum. They provide literal imagery which shows targets as one would normally see them. These sensors also provide the best spatial resolution for identification and technical analysis.

Infrared sensors record reflected or radiant temperatures. Infrared detectors are passive and sense longer wavelengths than visible light. They can detect the thermal or radiating temperature differences between terrain and man-made objects. These sensors do not produce energy to illuminate an object like radar. They can image day or night but lose effectiveness during transition periods between day and night (1.5 hours after sunrise and sunset) when there is the least difference in temperature between targets and the background. This type of sensor also provides good spatial resolution.

Radar sensors can penetrate bad weather and image at night because of its longer wavelength. It operates on the principle that all materials reflect a portion of electromagnetic radiation, and electromagnetic energy travels in straight lines at a constant velocity. Radar energy is directed from an antenna to a target. The energy is then reflected from the target back to the antenna. Radar produces non-literal imagery, that is difficult to interpret without training. This type of sensor has a day/night, all-weather capability.

Multispectral sensors simultaneously observe the same target in a number of spectral bands. Although its spatial resolution is poor, its spectral resolution allows it to detect differences between natural terrain and camouflage. It is useful for categorizing terrain, vegetation, urban areas, assessing agriculture, and detecting human activity. In **image 3**, there is a bright line leading from the northwest to the northeast portion of the image. This signature was caused by Iraqi forces moving toward Kuwait City.




Image 3

Available Platforms

Imagery platforms available to support tactical commanders' requirements are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Tactical Air Reconnaissance (Tac Air Recce), National Technical Means (NTM), and civil imaging satellites.

UAVs are beginning to be fielded by U.S. forces for the collection of imagery and signals intelligence. These assets will normally be controlled by the ground force commander and can be tasked to provide him timely coverage of his battle space.


Tac Air Recce which is the oldest method of acquiring imagery is currently in transition from photographic to digital imaging systems. This will reduce the time from receipt to exploitation by eliminating the need for chemical processing. A number of Tac Air Recce platforms such as the Army Mohawk and the Air Force RF-4C are leaving the active inventory. Tac Air Recce is moving to the concept of using sensor pods, primarily on fighter aircraft, in an effort to increase survivability.

There is an effort to increase the utility of **NTM** imagery by reducing the classification and speeding up dissemination. This would make the product more accessible to operational forces. The key is to request this type of imagery through your collection manager.

Civil imaging satellites, both U.S. and foreign, are increasing in both numbers and capability. Although imagery from these systems are unclassified, they are useful for terrain analysis, detection, and some recognition tasks. This imagery gives the commander a means of watching a contingency area before having to perform a force projection mission. For example, by combining civil imagery with Digital Terrain Elevation Data (from the Defense Mapping Agency), you can generate a perspective view (**image 4**) from North Korea oriented toward South Korea.

There are two types of support an imagery section should be required to supply the commander:

(Continued on page 40)



Intelligence During Operation Market-Garden

by Captain Stewart W. Bentley

In September 1944 Allied commanders conceived and executed Operation Market-Garden. At this time Allied forces were on the heels of the retreating German Wehrmacht in northern France and the Rhine River bridges were tantalizingly close. Operation Market-Garden was a bold, lightning strike designed to facilitate the capture of the Ruhr and end the war within four months.

The operation involved three airborne divisions—the 1st (British), 82d (U.S.), and 101st (U.S.)—of the newly organized I Allied Airborne Army. They would seize key terrain along a land corridor from the Meuse-Escaut Canal through Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem in Holland. Then the British XXX Armored Corps, spearhead for the British Second Army, would attack.

Allied commanders, and some of their intelligence staffs, believed German units in the area of operations (AO) were disorganized and incapable of conducting an effective resistance. As events unfolded, the opposite was true.

On September 3, 1944, Field Marshal Model (who succeeded Field Marshal Rommel as commander of the German Western Front) ordered the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to the Venlo-Arnhem area.¹ Although understrength after the battle of Normandy, these units had refitted and rearmed before Operation Market-Garden. More than any other factor, the presence of these "crack" German divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps contributed to the virtual destruction of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem and the strategic failure of Market-Garden.

What role did intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination play in operational planning? How were signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) integrated into Allied intelligence prepara-

tion of the battlefield (IPB)? What follows is an examination of the use of intelligence during planning for one of the most dramatic combined arms operations of World War II.

Conflicting Reports

The rapid German withdrawal to defensive positions behind the Meuse-Escaut Canal made collection and analysis difficult for the British Second Army. However, information on the situation in the area of operations was available through various sources.

ULTRA had been operational since the spring of 1940.² Information the ENIGMA machine and the decryption staff at Bletchley Park provided was the best source of high-grade SIGINT during the war in Europe.

An ULTRA decryption on September 5 specifically mentioned that the 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions, along with the 2d and 116th Panzer Divisions (II SS Panzer Corps) were ordered to the Venlo-Arnhem area to rest and refit.³ However, the September 12 intelligence summary (INTSUM) of the British Twenty First Army Group placed the 2d and 116th Panzer Divisions in front of the U.S. Seventh Army. The INTSUM did not indicate that the 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions would constitute a serious threat to Market-Garden.⁴ As operational planning (begun September 10) continued, the XXX Corps G2 agreed with this opinion.⁵

Direction finding (DF)/intercept vans operating along the Twenty First Army Group front provided "low-grade" SIGINT. Their only contributions, were direction finding (DF) bearings on unit call signs which could confirm, but not deny, the presence of a particular unit.⁶

If the picture SIGINT provided seemed contradictory and confusing, the picture HUMINT provided was worse. Dutch resistance groups and Allied es-

pionage groups—that were hastily trained and infiltrated—sent widely disparate reports. These groups were poorly equipped and untrained though they were highly motivated.⁷ Because of the effectiveness of German DF operations, the intelligence these groups provided was difficult to disseminate. HUMINT was irregular and often exaggerated enemy composition and disposition.⁸

Allied forces continued to receive coherent, yet disturbing, reports about the 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions. The information usually came through the British Second Army via resistance line-crossers and Dutch liaison officers working with the I Allied Airborne Corps (subordinate to the First Allied Airborne Army).

An unspecified Second Army INTSUM dated September 7 (origin of this information unknown)⁹ stated that "Dutch resistance sources report that battered Panzer formations have been sent to Holland to refit, and mention Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception areas."¹⁰ The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces

(SHAEF) weekly INTSUM for the week of September 16, 1944, stated that these units were the 9th and probably the 10th Panzer Divisions. The summary also said they were being equipped with new tanks from a depot in nearby Cleve, Germany.¹¹

Major General Kenneth Strong, the SHAEF G2, and his staff produced this INTSUM. G2 analysts had combed through the voluminous, contradictory, and often vague SIGINT and HUMINT reports looking for the missing Panzer Divisions. They finally determined the location and activity of the II SS Panzer Corps on the basis of reports from Arnhem's Dutch underground chief, Henri Knap, which confirmed the ULTRA reports.

Although Strong and his staff could not speculate on the Panzer Corps' strength and fighting ability, General Strong did inform Eisenhower's chief of staff that they were being resupplied with new tanks.¹²


Strong's intelligence reports so alarmed Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, that he personally visited Field Marshal Montgomery (Commander, Twenty First Army Group). However the information was "ridiculed,"¹³ and General Smith's objections to the operation based on the enemy situation were "waved...aside."¹⁴

General Smith was not the only one disturbed by ULTRA and resistance reports of armor in the area of operations. Major Brian Urquhart (25 years old), Lieutenant General Roy Browning's I Airborne Corps intelligence officer, was also alarmed. He requested air reconnaissance over the Arnhem area five days before D-Day. However, because of bad weather, sorties totaling eight aircraft only were flown on September 12 and 16.¹⁵

There is a marked discrepancy in the results of these flights. The official post-war narrative states that "nothing significant" was observed. However, Major Urquhart recalled that five oblique angle pictures showed "the unmistakable presence of German armor" in the Arnhem area.¹⁶ Unfortunately, this did not impress General Browning, who had operational command of Market-Garden.¹⁷

Of all of the available information, the dependable SIGINT that ULTRA provided should have been the most convincing. This information was provided and ignored by SHAEF and the Twenty First Army Group. It specifically mentioned the presence of the 9th and 10th Panzer at Arnhem.¹⁸

Another complication was that intelligence was filtered as it passed through several levels of command and across Allied intelligence channels. At the highest level, the SHAEF G2 provided information to the Twenty First Army Group, through the Second



Army (General Dempsey), to XXX Corps (Lieutenant General Horrocks) which conducted the armored attack toward Amhem. For the airborne operation, information came through SHAEF to the First Allied Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Brereton, seconded by Browning) then down to the three subordinate airborne divisions.


Differing Opinions

The problem with intelligence during the planning of Market-Garden was not so much dissemination as divergent opinions between G2 staffs. The Twenty First Army Group received ULTRA decrypts from SHAEF and lower-level enemy prisoner of war and SIGINT DF reports from subordinate units. The Twenty First Army Group also received resistance reports from the 2d Army G2. However, the 21st Army Group did not agree with intelligence reports from other echelons on the composition and disposition of armor units in the area of operations.¹⁹

It appears that intelligence down to the regimental level (at least) agreed with SHAEF INTSUMS. Part of the intelligence annex of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division operations order, dated September 12, 1944, reads in part: "There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days....A captured document indicates that the degree of control exercised over the regrouping and collecting of the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the fighting capacity of the new battle groups formed from the remnants of battered divisions seems unimpaired."²⁰ This in itself presents a clear statement that German command and control, logistics, and fighting abilities should not to be underestimated.

As to the presence of German armor in the AO, the annex states: "One of the broken Panzer Divisions has been sent back to the area north of Amhem to rest and refit; this might produce some 50 tanks. Therefore, we may reckon that the forces from Rotterdam to the German frontier might comprise a Regiment from the 719th Division, a regiment from the 347th Division, remnants of the 70th Division, a few mobile battalions, some scraped up static troops, and one Panzer Division, much worse for wear."²¹

In the Nijmegen area—the 82d Airborne Division's objective—the 504th S2 estimated 4,000 SS soldiers, with a total German strength of a division size.²²



Actual Enemy Strength

The annex quotes SHAEF, as of September 1, estimating the 9th Panzer Division at 3,000 troops and the 10th Panzer Division at 2,000. The tables of organization and equipment strength of a Panzer Division in World War II was 9,000.²³ The estimate of 50 tanks in the Amhem area was not too far off the mark; there were actually 58 tanks in the area.²⁴ What was not considered was that the soldiers operating these tanks were some of the best in the Wehrmacht and, because of superb German logistics, their strength was growing daily.

All of this begs the question: What were the actual committed and reinforcing forces in the Market-Garden AO? At the beginning of operations on September 17, Field Marshal Model had four divisional battle groups along the Meuse-Escaut Canal (line of departure and forward line of own troops for XXX Corps). A total of 6,000 personnel were committed through the airborne area of operations, including—

- ☐ The 59th Infantry Division.
- ☐ The 9th SS Panzer with one company of 20 Mark V Panthers.
- ☐ An armored infantry regiment with 40 armored personnel carriers (APCs) with heavy machine guns.
- ☐ One towed artillery battalion.
- ☐ Two self-propelled assault gun batteries.
- ☐ Hauptmann Paul Grabner's armored reconnaissance battalion.

The 10th SS Panzer had 3,500 personnel.²⁵ It was probably equipped with—

- ☐ One armored infantry regiment.
- ☐ Two artillery battalions.
- ☐ One armored reconnaissance battalion.

The significance is that while tank estimates were close, the presence and number of APCs, assault gun batteries, and towed artillery units were ignored. These other units pushed the combat power in favor of the Germans.

When Model began issuing deployment orders for reinforcements, he committed the 280th Assault Gun Brigade, the 107th Panzer Brigade, the 407th Landeshuetzen (Infantry) Division, Division von Tettau (training), and the 16th Panzer Training Battalion into sector to defeat the Allied operation.²⁶ A German directive issued September 19 committed the 1st, 2d, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions into the area of operations.²⁷

The most significant commitment of reinforcements began September 24 (D+7) with the delivery of 60 Tiger tanks from the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion to II SS Panzer Corps. Forty-five of these went to the understrength 10th Panzer Division.²⁸

In Summary

Initially, Allied intelligence collection assets complemented each other and were able to piece together a fairly coherent picture of German equipment strength as of September 1. Nevertheless, by September 17, the picture had changed. Intelligence analysts had vastly underestimated the recuperative powers of the German logistical system.

Additionally, while Allied intelligence collection assets noted the presence of tanks, they did not take into account APCs, self-propelled gun batteries, and towed artillery in determining German fighting power. This is reflected in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment intelligence annex where the emphasis had been on tanks and troop strength. Aside from air defense artillery units in the area, other units, specifically armored infantry regiments and self-propelled gun batteries, were not even mentioned.

The airborne troops, armed with only light machine guns and light antitank weapons, were at a disadvantage against the Germans. This was tersely noted in the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) Staff Study Number 3: "Fewer tanks were encountered than had been predicted, but the overall coordinated strength was greater."²⁹ The only advantage British airborne units enjoyed was defending in the urban environment of Arnhem. This actually gave them a degree of mobility against armored vehicles which had to operate in narrow confines with limited fields of fire.

What would have been the outcome had the intelligence community convinced the operational commanders to change the concept of Market-Garden? Two options were mentioned. Lieutenant General Bedell Smith recommended dropping one more airborne division in addition to the three-and-a-half divisions (to include a Polish brigade) the plan involved.³⁰ The other plan would have shifted the airborne operation in a more easterly direction toward

Wesel, directly over the Rhine. Interviews with German generals later indicate that this was a weakly defended area.³¹

Intelligence operations that supported Market-Garden stand as a reminder to intelligence officers of our primary duty: **We must paint the picture for our commanders as it is, not as we or they wish it to be.** Estimating combat power is not merely estimating numbers of heavy weapon systems. Intelligence professionals must always include the human factor into IPB.

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RUSSIA UNFURLS ITS NEW/OLD MILITARY DOCTRINE



by Albert L. Weeks, Ph.D.

Editor's Note: This article updates some of the information in "Russia's New Military Doctrine," by Mary C. FitzGerald which appeared in the October-December 1992 issue of MIPB.

"If Yeltsin was under the thumb of the generals before 'Red October' [1993]," says a leading, independent U.S. authority on the Russian Armed Forces, "the military has a stranglehold on him now." Indeed, many published analysts believe that President Yeltsin had to strike a deal with the army leadership in order to violently crush the conspirators (under Alexander Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbavlatov, and Generals Viktor Barannikov and Vyacheslav Achalov) last October. It is believed that the army deliberately delayed a counterattack for almost a whole day on "Bloody Sunday" (October 1993) until Yeltsin agreed to their terms (and still refused to use air power).

Today there is plenty of evidence that Yeltsin needs the military more than they need him. **Russian Independent Gazette** observer, Arkady Chershnya, bluntly stated: "The President now owes an unpaid debt to the military. We may expect increased conservative officers' corps pressure on the government in policy formation and strengthening of the influence of the various military-industrial groupings. As the experience of other countries attests,

such influence, however, is totally inconsistent with efforts to reform Russia into a fullfledged civil society." Incidentally, the October 15, 1993 issue of the **Christian Science Monitor** reported that the Defense Ministry requested a stunning 50 percent increase in the 1994 military procurement budget.

The partial text of a new, hardline military doctrine is the latest indication of the reality of an increase in military clout. This increase began well before "Red October." The doctrine was publicized, but not completely published, by the Russian Ministry of Defense on November 4, 1993. While much of the American media treated the event routinely, **The Wall Street Journal's** and **The (London) Daily Telegraph's** headlines were, "Russian Military Asserts Itself in New Doctrine" and "Yeltsin Pays for Help" respectively. What was not mentioned in any of the stories, however, was that a core of military hardliners have been working on a more aggressive doctrine for more than two years. Meanwhile, in recent months, Yeltsin had moved noticeably closer to the military's viewpoint on many questions affecting the defense policy.

The military authors of the new doctrine have scrapped the revised doctrine of the Gorbachev period (specifically 1991) which was largely a propaganda exercise lacking specifics. The present, more traditional draft is a product of the Defense Ministry Collegium (which has a mixture of "Afghantsi," or Afghan war commanders) and the General Staff Academy. The latest formulation, which is silent about strategy, is reminiscent of the type of militant doctrine used by Leonid Brezhnev. In fact, the document even contains an updated version of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" legitimizing Russian military intervention abroad—in this case, in what Russians call the "near-abroad." This includes the non-Russian borderlands, particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The doctrine was also traditional in the way it was presented: by keeping the major portions (technical and operational) secret while disclosing only the "tip of the iceberg." Released publicly as only a 24-page summary, enough was in the synopsis itself in addition to my own reading of the latest issues of the Russian General Staff journal to draw some meaningful inferences. Furthermore, I have been informed by confidential sources about a large amount of the secret portion of the doctrine. It is clear, either implicitly or explicitly, that—

1. While the "likelihood of world war has significantly lessened, it cannot be ruled out completely." Russia, it states, must be ready to conduct both defensive and offensive operations, the latter on an intercontinental scale if necessary.

2. Indications (from statements found by authoritative writers in several issues of the General Staff monthly journal) are that Russia still supports a launch-on-warning (LOW) strategy in the event of the threat of nuclear missile attack. This strategy is an update of the earlier strategy of the late 1970s and early 1980s when General Makhmut Gareyev (Deputy Chief of the General Staff and one of the authors of this new doctrine) echoed the views of his mentor, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who defined the strategy of a preemptive strike. Some of the contributors to the General Staff journal, **Military Thought** indicate that one pretext for maintaining LOW is the rising danger to Russia of "rogue" missile attacks and accidental launches "from whatever azimuth."

3. The most likely enemies, it is hinted, are still found in the West as well as to the "south." Russian strategic-missile commander General Igor Sergeyev bluntly told **60 Minutes** correspondent Ed Bradley in an interview that quadruple-warhead SS-17 strategic missiles are still targeted on the U.S. The general did not say how many, but indicated that other ICBMs are kept "in reserve"—evidently concealed. The "threat of a new world war," the document states, while reduced, definitely "has not been eliminated." This view agrees with that found in a number of articles that have appeared in the General Staff journal since the August 1991 coup attempt.

4. A threat from any quarter—west, south, or east—will not be met by a defensive strategy, as was stated in the Gorbachev doctrine, but by a traditional offensive strategy that incorporates the usual set of Soviet-style principles:

- ☐ Surprise.
- ☐ Advantageous initiation of hostilities.
- ☐ Qualitative/quantitative firepower superiority.
- ☐ Use of nuclear weapons.
- ☐ Exploitation of diplomatic and other forms of "maskirovka" (concealment).
- ☐ "Dezinformatsiya" (disinformation).
- ☐ Deep penetration, seizure of enemy territory.



According to the official text, a press spokesman for Yeltsin characterized this strategy as "active protection of Russia's vital interests." The word "active" suggested to some Western observers the use of the word "assertive" to describe the new doctrine.

5. "Nuclear deterrence" means the definitive threat of crushing nuclear strikes from Russia against any potential enemy. Thus, the propaganda

line of "no first use" by the Soviet side (dating back to the mid-1970s) has been dropped altogether from the new doctrine. The no-first-use line as found in the opening political section of the old doctrine was irrelevant to the rest of the Brezhnev doctrine that advocated, like the present doctrine, taking the nuclear initiative when deemed necessary.

6. Defense expenditures will no longer be held to the Gorbachev slogan of "reasonable" or "adequate" defense. Military modernization will take place according to the principle of "necessary" (a new term) pre-war preparation in peacetime. The focus now is on—

- ☐ high-tech modernization (especially U.S./Gulf War type electronics) to include enhanced command and control systems, electronic attack and electronic protection systems, high-precision conventional arms, and night-vision devices.
- ☐ rapid deployment of troops and equipment together with enhancement of airlift capability and capacity.
- ☐ accelerated staff planning for local war contingencies.
- ☐ proactive, worldwide Russian diplomacy "to preclude war".
- ☐ an ample-sized, partly volunteer army.

7. As a substitute for the missing ingredient of "Marxist-Leninist ideology" (in the sense of Soviet-period political indoctrination) are references to indoctrinating soldiers with sacred Russian patriotism and selfless sacrifice for the Russian Motherland.

Dr. Weeks is a widely-published specialist on Soviet and post-Soviet defense policy. His articles on the Soviet and post-Soviet military have appeared in numerous journals both here and abroad—Air University Review, Military Review, Strategic Review, and MIPB. Dr. Weeks is a World War II veteran, and formerly USAF navigator.

Russia's Military Doctrine



by Robert Arnett, Ph.D.

In May 1992, President Yeltsin announced the formation of the Russian Armed Forces from remnants of the Soviet Armed Forces. For 18 months from that date, Russian officials and the military debated over the draft text of a military doctrine intended to guide the development of the armed forces. On November 2, 1993, President Yeltsin approved the document which established Russia's military doctrine.

The new doctrine is notable because it reflects—

- ☐ Both continuity and significant change from past doctrine.
- ☐ A desire for a high-technology military but the recognition of current economic realities.
- ☐ Ongoing debate over national security policies.

Specifically, the doctrine—

- ☐ Reaffirms basic principles that have guided the development of the Russian Armed Forces during the past two years.
- ☐ Focuses on Russia and the near-abroad (states of the former Soviet Union). The document reflects Yeltsin's emphasis on political, diplomatic, and other peaceful means to resolve national security problems. However, two distressing aspects of the doctrine are the suggestion that the military might be used to protect ethnic Russians in the near-abroad,

and the increased reliance on nuclear weapons.

- ☐ States the necessity to reconcile defense spending with the nation's economic potential. At the same time, it mandates force modernization and maintenance of viable research and development (R&D) capabilities.

- ☐ Emphasizes the need to maintain stability in regions adjacent to Russia and recognizes

the existence of significant internal threats within the country. As a result, military missions now include peacekeeping operations in the near-abroad and assisting internal troops

to counter threats within Russia.

- ☐ Lists "expansion of military alliances" (clearly a reference to NATO) as an "existing or potential source of military danger to Russia."

The November 1993 document should not be viewed as the final word on Russia's military doctrine. Debates continue on the nature of the threat, the amount of resources that should be devoted to the development of military capabilities, the size of the armed forces, and how and when they should be used to protect ethnic Russians living outside Russia.

Key Provisions

The following are the key provisions of the new Russian doctrine:

1. Create a smaller, more mobile, and more professional armed forces. To accomplish this, Russia must—

- ☐ **Reduce the size of the armed forces.** The new doctrine states that the armed forces will be reduced "to the level prescribed," but does not specify what level. This wording indicates the military leadership is succeeding in overturning the former Russian parliament's law limiting the size of the armed forces in peacetime to 1 percent of the total population—1.5 million people. Defense Minister Grachev has stated that the law failed to consider the size of the territory and the length of Russia's borders. He has suggested an armed force of about 2.1 million. Current authorized strength

is 2.3 million, with an actual strength of 1.2 to 1.5 million.

- ☐ **Create mobile forces.** The document lists as a top priority the creation of mobile forces. This force could be quickly redeployed to reinforce peacetime forces within Russia or in the near-abroad. These forces have a regional, instead of global, orientation.
- ☐ **Complete the transition to a mixed manpower acquisition system.** The doctrine reaffirms the program, which began last year to transition from a conscript army to a mixed conscript-volunteer force. In 1993, 105,000 adults signed up on a volunteer basis. The goal is to have 30 percent of all enlisted and NCO personnel on voluntary status by 1995 and 50 percent by 2000.

- ☐ **Prepare for both offensive and defensive operations.** The new doctrine states that the armed forces will be prepared to conduct both offensive and defensive operations. In 1990, at the height of the influence of civilian reformers, the military's draft doctrine stated that the armed forces would be trained only for defensive operations. Since then, military leaders have reasserted the need to be able to conduct all types of operations. The doctrine, however, does not require a standing capability to conduct strategic offensive operations.

2. Maintain a viable defense R&D and production capability. The doctrine calls for the development of a defense industrial base that can produce sufficient modern weapons and that can react to emerging threats and military-technical breakthroughs. The doctrine has a guaranteed provision of resources for R&D and production of weapons and equipment. It also calls for restructuring the defense industry to eliminate its dependence on weapon components from the near-abroad, and to implement measures to ensure the mobilization readiness of the economy.

3. Develop a future force with high-technology weaponry. The doctrine makes clear an intent that the armed forces will eventually have high-technology weapons and support systems like those

used in the Persian Gulf War. Soviet military theorists have discussed this for over a decade.

4. Increase reliance on nuclear weapons. The doctrine does not include the "no-first use" pledge, in regard to nuclear weapons, that has been part of declared Soviet policy since 1982. The pledge was originally made when Russia had massive conventional capabilities which reduced the reliance on nuclear weapons. The omission of the pledge, in conjunction with other Russian doctrinal writings and statements, signals an increased reliance on nuclear weapons.

Russian military leaders, during the past two years, have advocated a new reliance on nuclear weapons in response to the drastic decline in conventional force capabilities. Officials have also warned others that nuclear weapons would be used not only in response to a nuclear attack against Russia but also in an attack using conventional weapons on high-priority targets.

Russian statements regarding nuclear weapons are designed to enhance the deterrent effect of their nuclear weapons and may be intended as a veiled warning to Ukraine and other bordering states against collective actions which run counter to Russia's national interests. At the same time, the statements also suggest an increased likelihood of using nuclear weapons in a military conflict. Therefore, Russia's drastically reduced conventional force capabilities may lead to lowering the threshold on the use of nuclear weapons.

5. Define expanded missions for the armed forces. These include—

- ☐ **Assume an internal role.** As a result of an intensifying internal threat, the armed forces have the mission to support the nation's internal security forces. The military can be called upon to respond to the following threats: separatist and organized crime activities, attempts to overthrow the constitutional system, attacks on nuclear power stations and facilities, attacks on weapons arsenals, the formation of illegal armed formations, and the illegal distribution of arms and narcotics. Russian military leaders have mixed feelings about the mission. On the one hand, they believe these internal threats are serious and must be dealt with by whatever forces are available. On the



other hand, such activity interferes with training military units for their primary mission—defending against external threats. The military realizes this could lead to their being dragged into political disputes. As a result, the military's preference is for Russia's internal troops to handle this mission. In fact, the document states that the "utilization of the armed forces in support of individual groups of people, parties, or public associations is not permitted."

- ☐ **Assign a new peacekeeping mission.** The doctrine assigns as an official mission, the participation of the armed forces in U.N. and other collective security peacekeeping operations. This provision has been a mission assigned by the Russian government during the past year and was part of the May 1992 draft doctrine.
- ☐ **Protect Russian "citizens" outside Russia.** The doctrine states that "the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states" is an existing or potential source of external military danger to Russia. This phrasing suggests that Russia reserves the right to use the military to intervene in the near-abroad to protect ethnic Russians living in these states. Currently, 25 million ethnic Russians live in these states, and in some states their citizenship and rights have yet to be resolved. As a result, Russian officials believe that Russia must ensure their rights are protected. Yeltsin believes this objective can be accomplished by political means; other Russian officials believe that military means are required.

6. Emphasize Yeltsin's view of national security and fiscal restraint. The doctrine emphasizes the continuing importance of arms control and bilateral and multi-lateral security agreements as a means of enhancing Russia's security. Specific measures listed to include—

- ☐ Protection of arms reduction treaties.
- ☐ International mechanisms to monitor weapons proliferation.
- ☐ Multi-lateralization of talks on nuclear disarmament.
- ☐ Agreements to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear testing.
- ☐ Confidence-building measures in the military sphere.
- ☐ Limiting naval forces and operations.
- ☐ Military cooperation, especially with the near-abroad and Central and Eastern Europe.

Additionally, the doctrine connects military allocations to economic potential. During the Soviet period, the armed forces received priority in resource allocations to the detriment of the Russian people. The newly approved doctrine establishes the intent to keep the development of the armed forces proportionate to the economic potential of the country.

7. Reassess the extent and nature of military threats to Russia. The doctrine makes the following points on the threat to Russia:

- ☐ **The changing nature of the threat.** The doctrine reflects recent major changes in the evaluation of threats to Russia. It states that the possibility of world nuclear or conventional war in the foreseeable future has been greatly diminished; however, the possibility still exists. Regional wars and local conflicts on the periphery of Russia are considered to be the main dangers to peace and stability. Other sources of external military concern include expansion of military blocs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and external interference in Russia's internal affairs. The doctrine also illustrates serious concerns about Russia's internal threats, including illegal activities by separatists, creation of illegal armed formations, attacks on nuclear power and chemical weapons facilities, attempts to overthrow the government, growth of organized crime, and illegal distribution of arms and narcotics.
- ☐ **No enemies.** Current Russian doctrine states that Russia has no enemies. The new principle reflects the general view of the Yeltsin government, not the view of the military. One Russian general specifically stated that the military does not subscribe to the belief that Russia has no enemies.
- ☐ **Concerns about military alliances.** The doctrine reflects the concern of Russian officials who do not favor the inclusion of Eastern European nations into NATO. It lists "the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interest of the Russian Federation's military security" as one of the "existing or potential sources of external military danger for the Russian Federation."

8. New emphasis on military-technical cooperation. The doctrine calls for military-technical cooperation with other states, especially former Soviet republics, to—

- ☐ Strengthen Russia's military-political position.
- ☐ Earn foreign currency.
- ☐ Maintain the nation's arms export potential.

(Continued on page 41)

THE AUTOMATED EVENT ANALYSIS MATRIX



by Major Timothy P. Gavin and
Captain Kenneth M. Krumm

In the past, the preparation of an accurate event analysis matrix involved a complicated "stubby pencil drill." Just one change in the enemy's rate of movement invalidated the entire effort. Automating the event analysis matrix precludes the "stubby pencil drill" and allows the intelligence officer to use time more effectively.

Currently, Army doctrine depicts stagnant time lines on the event template. While this method is useful, it does not adequately address follow-on forces throughout the depth of the battlefield. A G2/S2 or senior intelligence officer (SIO) looking at an event template with time lines (that may not be valid once movement begins) can only guess at the true rate of movement. Unfortunately, the synchronization of intelligence and all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSS) hinges on this prediction. Therefore, a better method was needed to assist in predicting enemy movement rates for each course of action on a fluid battlefield.

To meet this objective, the G2 Plans Section, 1st Infantry Division (Mech) developed an Automated Event Analysis Matrix (AEAM) using a Microsoft Excel spread sheet. The AEAM gives the G2/S2 or SIO the ability to accurately predict multiple enemy movement rates throughout the depth of the battlefield before and during the battle.

During the 1st ID(M) Warfighter exercise in April 1993, the plans section used a calculator to develop a similar spread sheet. Although accurate, this technique is time-consuming and tedious. Automation of this process increases the speed of the calculations and permits the rapid development of alternate courses of action.

The 2d Brigade, 1st ID(M) first successfully used the AEAM during their National Training Center rotation in June 1993. The 1st ID(M) again used the AEAM with success during the III Corps train-up and Warfighter Exercise in November and December 1993 at Fort Hood, TX. Following these validations, the AEAM has rapidly become an essential part of planning for the 1st ID(M).

Figure 1. Automated Event Analysis Matrix

To complete the AEAM, the G2/S2 or SIO needs to know the location of the enemy in relation to friendly forces. Distances are then measured from the enemy to friendly forces between named areas of interest (NAIs) or events and placed in the distance column. The total distance is automatically computed at the bottom of the column.

Figure 2. Distance Column (Box)

The G2/S2 or SIO then determines the enemy's rate of movement (speed). Each box allows for different speeds depending on the weather and terrain. Two speed columns are highlighted for the first and second echelon divisions. Speed is automatically averaged at the bottom of the speed column.

Figure 3. Speed Columns (Box)

The G2/S2 or SIO can predict when the enemy will arrive at a known location. For example, the commander wants to know when the first echelon regiment, first echelon division (1/1) departing NAI 800 at 1300 will arrive at engagement area (EA) Custer. The AEAM automatically calculates that 1/1 will arrive at EA Custer at 1600. The AEAM can be adjusted to reflect the actual time a unit begins to move by changing the time block.

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	6	22		50	54.5	65
NAI/EVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	6	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL/AVG	40	8					8			

Figure 1. Automated Event Analysis Matrix

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	6	22		50	54.5	65
NAI/EVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	6	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL/AVG	40	8					8			

Figure 2. Distance Column (Box)

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	6	22		50	54.5	65
NAI/EVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	6	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL/AVG	40	8					8			

Figure 3. Speed Columns (Box)

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	8	22		50	54.5	65
NA/EVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	8	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL/AVG	40	8					8			

Figure 4. Start Time (Box)

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	8	22		50	54.5	65
NA/EVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	8	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL/AVG	40	8					8			

Figure 5. Units and Distance (Box)

Figure 4. Start Time (Box)

Doctrinal distances between enemy units are placed at the top of the matrix. Figure 5 shows the Division Artillery Group, 4.5 kilometers behind the

lead element of the first echelon regiment (1/1). This distance can be changed during the course of the battle by simply typing in a new distance. The time blocks, which correspond to the distance blocks, will

Automation: An Intelligence Multiplier

by Captain Gregory J. Conti

Editor's Note: Captain Conti is writing a series of articles on automation. MIPB will print these in future issues as space permits.

As you probably already know, computers make your work easier and more efficient. Whether processing intelligence at the strategic or tactical level, automation will greatly increase your section's effectiveness. Computers can be used to train your soldiers, to access huge data bases of information, to communicate, and to disseminate.

With the equipment you probably have on hand, you can take advantage of a wealth of applications to help you work smarter, not harder. The following examples are based on my experiences with the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Stewart, GA, and Desert Shield/Storm. These skills are easy to master with a little practice.

E-mail

Electronic Mail (E-mail) is a fact of life throughout the Army. With it you can send information instantly to virtually any commander or staff section in your

H-HOUR EQUALS		12:00		4.5	6	22		50	54.5	66
NAVEVENT	DIST(km)	SPEED	1/1	DAG	AAG	2/1	SPEED	1/2	DAG	2/2
NAI 800	10	10	13:00	13:27	13:36	15:12	10	18:00	18:27	19:30
PL SHERMAN	6	10	13:36	14:03	14:12	15:48	10	18:36	19:03	20:06
NAI 820	8	10	14:24	14:51	15:00	16:36	10	19:24	19:51	20:54
DP1	10	5	15:24	15:51	16:00	17:36	5	20:24	20:51	21:54
EA CUSTER	6	5	16:00	16:27	16:36	18:12	5	21:00	21:27	22:30
TOTAL TIME	40	8					8			

Figure 6. Adding or Deleting Columns

automatically adjust. The distances shown in Figure 5 are taken from **Government Training Aid 30-1-2, Soviet Doctrinal Templates**, using a motorized rifle division in the attack.

Figure 5. Units and Distance (Box)

Additionally, vertical and horizontal columns can be added for additional units, NAIs, or events being tracked. Likewise, unused columns can be deleted from the matrix.

Figure 6. Adding or Deleting Columns

It is important to note that the AEAM is not a stagnant spread sheet. The AEAM is continuously updated to give the commander the latest prediction on when enemy forces will be at a given location on the battlefield. Additionally, updated versions are dated and disseminated to all staff elements to maintain continuous synchronization.

To plan for future operations, the planning staff

uses the tactical decision-making process outlined in **Student Text 100-9, The Tactical Decision Making Process** (Army Command and General Staff College). The AEAM helps staff planners synchronize friendly BOSSs. It automatically predicts enemy locations based on enemy doctrine in relation to time, distance, and rate of movement. When completed, the AEAM can be placed on the event template or decision support template, replacing linear time lines.

Student Text 100-9 describes the synchronization matrix as, "...a method to record the results of the wargaming by allowing the staff to synchronize the course of action across time and space in relation to the enemy's most likely course of action. The first entry is time, entered by the G2 and G3 as they visualize the operation." The end-state of the synchronization matrix rests squarely on the ability of the G2/S2 or SIO to accurately predict the enemy's

(Continued on page 41)

local area or across the country. You can use it to send a memorandum or a file to one individual or to a group of individuals simultaneously. With your computer you can set up address lists and can set the mail system to "return receipt." When the addressees have received and read their mail, you will receive a short note to that effect.

Imagine writing a memo about an up-coming inspection and, in one shot, E-mailing it to the battalion commander, the primary staff, and all the subordinate commanders; and then knowing the exact time they received it. Of course, you still can follow-up with hard copy through the normal distribution system.

To use E-mail, you need a computer with a modem (phone connection), a phone line, a communi-

cations program (like Procomm), and access to a post E-mail system. A communications program allows your computer to dial the phone and connect with the central mail system. You can find Procomm, Microsoft® Windows Terminal (included with Windows), or a similar program at most units, or you can buy it (they are expensive) through local purchase. Procomm is also available free through Shareware.

To learn about your E-mail system, contact an experienced user or attend Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) or Division Automation Management Office (DAMO) E-mail classes. Attend these classes yourself, and send as many of your personnel as possible. Secure your commander's

(Continued on page 41)

THE ROLE OF THE G2 PLANNER



by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas R. Marsella

The success or failure of military operations begins in the planning stage. Likewise, the success of intelligence begins in the planning stage. As Major General John F. Stewart, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, remarked, the "goal is to meld intelligence with the scheme of fire and maneuver."

The G2 Planner begins the melding process by ensuring the wargame produces a viable friendly course of action (COA) based on the actions of a "thinking, uncooperative enemy"; and ensuring the plan can be supported by the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS). The G2 Planner begins the synchronization process and ensures the "right intelligence is provided at the right time."

The Planning Process

All too often, G2 Planners are either unprepared or unaware of what is expected of them; or the division planning process doesn't allow them to do their assigned mission. Regrettably, current doctrine does not clarify the duty position either.

Draft FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Procedures*, and the *Command and General Staff College Student Text 100-9, Command Estimate Process*, describe the steps of the deliberate planning process. However, they do not detail what the G2 Planner must do, nor do they provide a list of pitfalls that can occur in the planning process.

Although the FM 34 series provides clues on how intelligence personnel support the planning process, it does not detail the G2 Planner's mission. For example, FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, addresses the collection manager's role. While collection management officers (CMOs) might be included in a "deliberate planning process," they will rarely be able to participate in this process during operations because of competing demands.

G2 Planners represent the G2 and serve as the "eyes and ears" of the CMO, analysis and control element (ACE) or all-source production section (ASPS) chief, and G2 operations. The planner must work "friendly" with a variety of people in both the G2 and G3.

G2 Planners must be multi-talented. The planners must understand all aspects of enemy operations but specifically concentrate on enemy operational and tactical operations two levels up and down. They must rely on the ACE or ASPS to tell

them how the enemy will use his BOSs. The planners must think like the enemy commander and play an adversarial role during the wargaming process.

G2 Planners must be collection smart. They must know the capabilities and limitations of the collection systems at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC). They must be able to tell G2 operations—the proponent of intelligence synchronization—what and when products are needed to support the commander's decisions.

G2 Planners must be communications smart. They must understand how the division intelligence system passes and disseminates intelligence. This critical knowledge of architecture is especially important in a force projection army.

Common Sins

After watching many divisions execute the staff planning process, I have made a list of "thou shalt nots." While these "sins" are committed during the deliberate planning process, they become more conspicuous after the planning process, especially during combat operations.



1. The G3 Planner wargames without the G2 Planner. Considering that most G2 plans sections are "one deep," it is surprising this doesn't happen more often. While this is the least frequent sin, it is the most serious because it causes the G3 Planner to adopt a "faulty plan." The G3 Planner will adopt a plan based on what he wishes the enemy to do, not on what the enemy is likely to do.



2. The G2 Planner briefs an incomplete assessment. Planners using (or even worse, briefing) an incomplete or inaccurate assessment is another major sin. The G2, upon receipt of the mission, must analyze the current situation, clearly identifying (for the commanding general) the enemy's most probable and most dangerous courses of action. All too often, a staff will brief the corps assessment without performing a detailed analysis of the division's area of operations.

G2 Planners must identify in sufficient detail vulnerabilities to include when and where they will exist. While divisions track enemy battalions, G2 Planners must postulate and state enemy objectives two levels up, along with enemy actions necessary to accomplish their mission. Prior to briefing the mission analysis, the G2 should use a situation tem-

plate to illustrate these points.

3. The G2 Planner does not fight the enemy in a doctrinal or realistic manner during the wargame. The G2 Planner must think, act, and react as the enemy commander. A thorough knowledge of enemy doctrine is critical, in addition to describing the battlefield effects (applying weather, terrain, other political factors, etc.).



During the wargame, the G2 Planner must fight the battle using either the most probable or most dangerous enemy COA. The decision of which enemy COA to fight must be made during the planning process. The best solution is to ask the commanding general. In a perfect world with unlimited time, we could wargame all enemy COAs against all friendly COAs. With limited time, the selection of which COA to fight is critical.

4. G2 Planner believes "collection isn't my job." During the wargame, a series of questions (intelligence requirements) is identified. The answers to these questions drive the friendly plan. G2 Planners should identify intelligence requirements based on enemy actions or events at a given time and location. For example, "will the enemy cross the X River at this point at H+30."



These locations become named areas of interest (NAIs). Once these NAIs are known and the "collectable or observable" is identified, collection begins to take focus. The G2 Planner must be able to articulate these collection requirements to the CMO. During the wargame, the planner will identify those requirements which are dependent on corps or EAC collection systems. Identifying these requirements both up and down to other echelons will shape the collection effort. The most critical questions become the division's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

5. G2 Planner and G2 targeting team use different COAs. The entire G2 section must work off the same enemy COA. In many instances, a different set of cartoons exists throughout the G2 depicting enemy COAs. Maintaining a common view of the future battle is just as important as maintaining a common view of the current battle at the tactical, main, and rear command posts.



If cartoons or sketches are used to depict an enemy COA, they must be accurate. Cartoons must accurately depict both red and blue locations, and should be close to scale. If the G3 produces a sketch of blue actions, I recommend placing at least the minimum red symbols or arrows to depict enemy

actions. The G2 enemy COA sketch must therefore show at least major friendly boundaries, phase lines, and significant terrain features. Sketches can sometimes send the wrong message, so ensure they reflect what you want the target audience, especially the commanding general, to understand.

6. Plan is published with only reference to "See Annex B" in the base plan. All



too often, the end products of the planning process (operations, plans, and fragmentary orders) are published before the planner has developed a clear intelligence concept. Once the commanding general selects a COA, a natural fallout of the wargaming process is the intelligence concept and recommended PIR. The intelligence paragraph should clearly identify the priorities for situation development, target development, and counterintelligence. It should clearly establish who has intelligence support priorities for each phase of the operation.

A key ingredient to any intelligence effort is getting the right equipment (including collectors, processors, and communications systems) and personnel at the right place, at the right time. All too often, intelligence is required "up front" during an operation. However, the equipment and personnel the MI community needs to deploy are not addressed before or during the wargaming process. During the wargaming process, the G2 Planner must clearly articulate the movement and deployment requirements to support the intelligence mission.

The End State

MI's mission is to provide timely and accurate intelligence to support the combat commander's decision-making process and protect the force. Accomplishment of this objective begins in the planning stage. Methods employed during the planning process must include:

- ☐ Accurate and precise intelligence preparation of the battlefield which is updated and used during the wargame.
- ☐ A complete wargame of the various potential friendly COAs against the enemy. The end state of the planning process is a friendly plan which: is feasible and acceptable, anticipates enemy actions, disrupts the enemy's tempo, and produces success.

For the MI community, the end state of the decision-making process is the synchronization of divisional IEW to support the commanders' mission. The G2 Planner is instrumental in this success.

LTC Marsella is the G2, 24th ID, Fort Stewart, GA.

The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element

by Lieutenant Colonel William V. Wenger, ARNG

Editor's Note: The IEWSE will be eliminated when the divisional MI battalions are restructured into three direct support (DS) companies, a general support (GS) company, and a headquarters and headquarters company under a new series of TOE. However, the support described in this article will apply to the DS company commander.

The MI battalion is a powerful combat multiplier in battlefield operations if trained and employed wisely. The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element (IEWSE) teams from the MI battalion advise and assist the maneuver brigade commander in the integration and execution of this combat multiplier.

The MI battalion S3, in accordance with the battalion commander's guidance, is responsible for the training and operational supervision of the IEWSE teams. Unfortunately, little information is available in Army publications about the IEWSE's duties and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The following concepts are a compilation of current doctrinal guidance and recent successful methods that the 140th MI Battalion used to support the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The ideas presented here serve as a start point for the development, training, and operation of IEWSE teams.

By doctrine, each maneuver brigade in a supported division has an IEWSE team, composed of an officer (O2 or O3) and an NCO (E5 or E6). The officer is usually a signals intelligence/electronic warfare (SIGINT/EW) 35G, and the NCO is a SIGINT/EW analyst. This team advises the brigade commander and staff on the integration and use of MI assets.

The IEWSE function is similar to that of the fire support element which provides artillery liaison in the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). The IEWSE team is deployed with maneuver brigades, regardless of whether the brigade is committed or in reserve. However, brigades in reserve do not have supporting MI assets. The aviation brigade, the cavalry squadron, division main, division TAC, and the division rear command post do not normally receive an IEWSE from the MI battalion. To properly use

IEWSE teams, it is essential to clearly understand their specified and implied tasks.

Specified Tasks

The specified tasks are those tasks specifically stated in the operations order as required for mission accomplishment. The following are specified tasks:

1. Advise the brigade commander and staff of the capabilities, limitations, integration, and use of IEW assets.
2. Help the brigade S2 and S3 integrate and synchronize supporting MI assets. Help prepare requests for EW missions, especially jamming, based on requests from the brigade, division collection management and dissemination, and G3 for execution by the MI battalion when in GS.
3. Help the brigade staff (including the S2, S3, fire support officer, and EW officers) develop high value command, control, communications, and intelligence targets.
4. Ensure effective liaison between the MI battalion and the supported brigade and maintain secure communications. The IEWSE is on the MI battalion operations net. Using headphones, it monitors the link between the MI company teams' platoon operations center (POC) and the technical control and analysis element (TCAE). The IEWSE must use all possible measures to maintain contact on this net.
5. Monitor and relay information regarding MI element losses in the supported brigade's area of operations (AO), especially when there's no MI company team in the AO.
6. Support the MI company team:
 - ☐ Help coordinate the brigade's requirements with the company team when in DS of the brigade.
 - ☐ Help the team commander coordinate logistic support, security within the supported brigade AO, and surveys for movement of assets.
 - ☐ Coordinate with the brigade to obtain terrain for IEW systems.
 - ☐ Inform the MI battalion TOC about any changes in the brigade mission or operational status, because they impact on the MI battalion and the supporting company team.

- Rapidly disseminate combat information obtained through EW which affects the supported brigade. This is primarily raw data transmitted from the POCs to the TCAE. The IEWSE monitors these transmissions, enhancing the timeliness of information to the brigade. Often the brigade may not receive the processed intelligence quickly enough to satisfy the maneuver commander's needs. Therefore, the brigade S2 must be informed of critical uncorrelated bits of information when this data is essentially raw.

Implied Tasks

The IEWSE's implied tasks are those tasks which will facilitate mission accomplishment, but are not necessarily explicit in the operations order. These implicit tasks are based on the assumption that few combat arms commanders (or their S2s and S3s) completely understand EW capabilities and employment. Many of these tasks are the responsibility of the brigade S2, S3, or communications-electronics officer. However, they can be delegated to the IEWSE at the discretion of the brigade commander. The following are implied tasks:

1. Maintain an accurate overlay showing all IEW assets, including the MI battalion TOC, in the brigade AO, using doctrinally correct graphics and symbols. The overlay should also include the location of human intelligence (HUMINT) assets including enemy prisoner of war collection points nearest the brigade AO. This overlay can be posted on the S3 and S2 maps at their request. The date-time group of the last update, along with initials of the person posting the data, should appear on a corner of the overlay.
2. Understand the division and brigade commander's intent, mission, scheme of maneuver, and concept of operations. The IEWSE should be prepared to brief IEW participation in the operation.
3. Provide the MI battalion with current brigade boundaries, forward line of own troops, phase lines, coordination points, named areas of interest, and targeted areas of interest.
4. Coordinate with the brigade S2 to ensure that ground surveillance radars are included and used in the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
5. Ensure the MI company team has the current brigade sign/countersign.
6. Provide MI battalion assets, through the team commander and/or POC, with specific information about the brigade AO. Describe in detail: obstacles and minefields, conditions of routes and bridges, security and protective fires, friendly forces, secondary and fallback locations, brigade primary and alternate

courses of action, and coordinating times and routes for deployment and redeployment.

7. Coordinate with the brigade staff to ensure availability of EW operational sites within the brigade sector.

8. Serve as a "salesman," advisor, and even instructor to the brigade commander, S2, and S3. Advocate those services which the MI battalion can and should provide through the IEWSE. However, IEWSE teams are advocates for all intelligence assets, not just EW assets.

9. Maintain a file of documents and references necessary for IEWSE operations. References should include field manuals, training circulars, and technical manuals; overlays; current operations orders and fragmentary orders; maps; and MI battalion and brigade tactical SOPs.

10. Know IEW doctrine, employment techniques, and the battalion operational concepts as outlined in the MI battalion tactical SOP.

11. Watch for information which could affect the operation of IEW assets in the brigade AO. Report these "nuggets" of information to the MI battalion immediately.

12. Develop a shift plan that covers IEW duties in the brigade TOC. Ensure that someone in the brigade S2/S3 section knows where the IEWSE soldiers are at all times. Use a standardized shift change brief to ensure pertinent information and requirements are passed from one shift to another.

13. Remain security conscious. Ensure the security clearances of the entire team are current. Before deployment, coordinate with the MI battalion S2 for formal notification of security clearance status to supported units. The IEWSE may need to carry critical classified information; therefore, make sure the entire team has valid courier orders.

14. Use EW capabilities to fill gaps in the brigade and division intelligence picture. Ensure accuracy and timeliness.

15. Do not interfere in brigade operations. The IEWSE is there to advise and assist, not to complicate the job of the brigade staff or maneuver elements. (This is not in conflict with item 8.; the right times must be found to advocate MI services.)

Deployment and Employment Considerations

The following are some helpful hints for the MI battalion before and during employment:

1. Assign a standard vehicle to each team on a long-term basis. Do not assign a vehicle at the last minute. Each IEWSE team should be assigned its own equipment, reference material, and enough supplies to complete the mission.

2. Provide two secure FM radios: one for the collection and jamming tasking and reporting net, and one for the battalion operations net. While this is not current doctrine, it is recommended for efficient IEWSE operations.

3. Establish a close working relationship with the brigade fire support element. This critical relationship allows for quick targeting information and artillery fire. Coordinate with the field artillery intelligence officer.

4. Establish a clear relationship between the brigade IEWSE and the MI company team commander in the AO. The allocation of responsibilities will vary from battalion to battalion and with mission requirements.

The main objective of the team's title should be the clear and immediate communication of its purpose and intent.

5. Consider an additional IEWSE from the MI battalion for critical short-term operations at the division main, division TAC, rear command post, aviation brigade, or the cavalry squadron. This provides unity of effort and clarity in planning and operations.

6. Write a brief IEWSE manual or SOP to include a mission statement, procedures, equipment lists, manuals, order of battle extracts, supplies, and communications equipment inventory.

7. Educate brigade personnel on IEW capabilities. This training can vary from tactful on-the-spot corrections, advice on employment, and requests for information; to conducting a formal briefing for the brigade commander, battalion commanders, and their staffs. The IEWSE should prepare and rehearse a standard brief under the supervision of the MI battalion S3.

8. Publish a two- to four-page IEWSE handout for maneuver commanders and their staffs. It should include the MI battalion and IEWSE mission statements, IEWSE services, key IEW acronyms, sample EW tactical employment in a brigade sector, and names and phone numbers of important points of contact in the MI battalion. The more the commanders and staffs know about EW employment, the more effective the integration and synchronization of IEW assets.

9. The IEWSE should not assume the brigade will provide a map, map board, communications wire, batteries, and a work area. The IEWSE should coordinate with the brigade for these items, and be prepared to draw these materials from the MI battalion before the operation.

10. Use the senior IEWSE officer as a section chief and primary trainer for all IEWSE teams. Otherwise, one IEWSE team usually gains more experience because only one of a division's brigades is usually deployed at a time.

Training

The IEWSE should maintain proficiency and train others as required on the following:

- ☐ Intelligence doctrine, including intelligence sources and methods such as EW, counterintelligence (CI), HUMINT, long-range surveillance, and deception planning.
- ☐ The MI battalion SOP.
- ☐ Capabilities of MI battalion DS and GS assets. Combat arms commanders frequently misunderstand the MI battalion support concept.
- ☐ Brigade and division SOPs as they impact EW employment.
- ☐ Enemy order of battle, including equipment identification.
- ☐ Threat weapon systems and their associated radars.
- ☐ Methods of request for EW support, electronic attack, and CI when the MI battalion is in DS and GS.
- ☐ The capabilities of MI assets at corps and echelons above corps.

The ability of IEWSE teams to absorb and disseminate information on IEW employment and doctrine is in direct proportion to their experience and maturity. The battalion S3 should monitor and nurture this ability.

IEWSE or EWL?

Finally, we need to simplify the title "intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE)." Electronic warfare liaison (EWL) or intelligence liaison (IL) is a less complicated designation and aptly describes the function. The main objective of the team's title should be the clear and immediate communication of its purpose and intent. A simplified title would help to advance this objective.

Whatever the liaison teams are called, their development, training, and employment are absolutely critical to the success of the MI battalion in support of battlefield operations.

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Viewpoint:

Electronic Warfare Procedures

by First Lieutenant Paul T. Carter

The effective execution of ground-based electronic warfare (EW) requires a standard set of tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure success. It is critical that the battlefield effects of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) units justify their existence. Therefore, the benefits of conducting EW must be greater than the cost associated with deploying IEW units. Otherwise, resources allocated by the maneuver commander to execute EW will be spent on battlefield operating systems (BOSS) other than intelligence.

Effective IEW units use certain procedures which allow the unit to develop viable intelligence products. Likewise, many problems found in less capable IEW units are often the result of inattention to, or ignorance of, certain critical areas. Following are some procedures, within five general areas, that IEW units can use to enhance their operations.

Event-Driven EW

Execution of a mission or other actions based solely on a time sequence (time-oriented execution) will fail. Time sequences provide only a guideline for when a specific event should occur (based on various templates) during an operation. Actual events, not a particular time, should key the execution of any EW actions. However, some units still key their electronic attack (EA) and electronic warfare support (ES) matrix by time rather than events.


Before each mission the maneuver commander and staff should identify specific events that are expected to occur based on enemy courses of action, friendly operations, and the wargaming process. Then the staff should plan EW events such as: asset movements, target acquisition, and jamming. The staff should develop a synchronization matrix listing these events. For example—

- ☐ EW assets should jam enemy reconnaissance units to prevent enemy reporting when a friendly air assault occurs.
- ☐ EW assets should jam any enemy unit re-

questing indirect fires when a friendly maneuver unit assumes an assault-by-fire position and engineers begin breaching a minefield.

In the planning process the staff should determine specific "triggers" to key these events. For example—

- ☐ During the air assault, the trigger for beginning jamming might be wheels-up (when the helicopters actually take off).
- ☐ During the breaching operation the trigger to begin jamming might be the initial movement of the engineers.



IEW units should use an EA/ES priority of effort chart or similar charts to complement the synchronization matrix. With event-driven EW, it is obviously critical for EW elements to have a good grasp on the mission, concept of the operation, and scheme of maneuver. Adequate EW planning requires a thorough knowledge of all the results of the planning process.

Once the results of the planning process are understood, planning for event-driven EW is not difficult. However, difficulty often occurs during execution. The "fog of war" usually prevents the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) and transcription and analysis (T&A) team of the platoon opera-

tions center (POC) from knowing when a trigger occurs. Frequently the maneuver battalion and brigade TOC do not know the status of an operation.

The key is for the TCAE and T&A teams to have a mechanism in place that allows them to recognize what happens on the battlefield. Cells should attempt to template (within reason) the status of an operation in order to maintain a picture of the operation. This will enhance the effectiveness of EW.

The liaison officer (LNO)/Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element (IEWSE) should help plan the EW synchronization matrix and be aware of the specific triggers that key each event. Thus, the maneuver TOC should provide the necessary information about the triggers to the LNO/IEWSE.

Editor's Note: The IEWSE will be eliminated when the divisional battalions are restructured into three direct support (DS) companies, a general support (GS) company, and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) under a new series of TOE. However, the support described in this article will apply to the DS company commander.

For example, the wheels-up time for a friendly air assault is scheduled for 0600, but actually occurs at 0630. The LNO/IEWSE should immediately inform the TCAE and T&A teams of any change, because wheels-up time is an EW trigger. In fact, one of the LNO/IEWSE's primary responsibilities should be to inform the analytical cells when these triggers occur. Planning a procedure to execute event-driven EW and creating mechanisms to provide intelligence when these events occur are critical.

Tasking

TCAE and T&A teams usually issue taskings based exclusively on the input from warrant officers or senior NCOs. The MI battalion commander, DS company commander, and other officers often fail to "leader check" the taskings because they are technical in nature. Leaders should ensure the taskings reflect targets that have been developed from the PIR. In other words, leaders should maintain awareness of the targets and categories of targets that must be acquired to support the maneuver commander. The MI battalion and DS company commanders must remember that they still retain tasking responsibility. This process should support the tenet "the commander drives intelligence."

The danger is that the focus is often lost in the complex and technical process of translating a general OPORD and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) into specific taskings. Leaders should first discuss the maneuver operation/events and the EW events that are to occur with the senior analysts.

This will help ensure taskings reflect these events. Next, leaders should periodically check the quality of the taskings to ensure they accurately reflect event-based operations. By doing this, the leadership synchronizes specific taskings with operations.

Maintenance Contact Teams

Statistically, an IEW unit is more likely to fail because of maintenance problems than enemy destruction. However, while most units place great emphasis (and rightly so) on conventional survivability factors (such as site security and mobility), some fail to even develop an adequate maintenance contact team SOP. Training on this SOP would allow those units to repair IEW equipment more quickly and efficiently.

Maintenance contact teams should be dispatched quickly from the DS company TOC, POC, or TCAE. The appropriate maintenance contact team should talk via FM (on an administrative net) to the IEW team about the maintenance problem before they leave the TOC. Often problems can be fixed by a "talk-through." This also allows the contact team to hear the nature of the problem directly from the IEW team. The contact and IEW team should establish far and near recognition signals and an estimated time of arrival (ETA) to prohibit fratricide when the contact team arrives. The TOC should log the contact team's departure time, destination, and ETA. This facilitates dispatching the contact team from its current location directly to other EW teams. The TOC should always maintain the locations of all contact teams.

Maintaining strong maintenance contact team procedures is common sense, yet some units dispatch maintenance contact teams with little thought. Efficient, well-executed maintenance procedures and training are essential to the safety and productivity of the entire IEW unit.

Team Training

Communications intelligence (COMINT) cells primarily utilize 98Cs as analysts. A general perception exists that the best analysts come from strategic level units because of the "live environment." Unfortunately, many "live environments" (especially now) lack good tactical targets for training; therefore, many analysts are not trained on enemy doctrine and order of battle. On the other hand, analysts stationed in tactical units have limited "live environment" training to sharpen their skills. TROJAN and REDTRAIN opportunities partially fill this training void. To enhance the tactical training environment, scripted exercises (SCRIPTEXs) are invaluable training tools. SCRIPTEX traffic is transmitted, inter-

cepted by the EW teams, "gisted" and passed to the analytical cell, analyzed, and reported to the control cell. SCRIPTEXs offer every advantage of "live environment" training and the scenarios are tactically oriented according to your training goal. Analysts sharpen their skills and gain experience on how a particular enemy fights. The training is inexpensive and, more important, the controllers know exactly—

- ☐ What information is being transmitted.
- ☐ What the analytical conclusions should be.
- ☐ What information should be reported.

This can be rolled into a good AAR for the soldiers. We found SCRIPTEXs are efficient tools in training an IEW company team. All IEW units should use SCRIPTEXs as part of their training program.

EA Operations

Successful, event-driven jamming is one of the most difficult tasks for units to execute because it requires intricate planning and must be executed with precision. The G3 is responsible for EW at division and corps levels, and is assisted by his EW section, in coordination with the G2 and the fire support element (FSE). Because of the rapid tempo and fluid nature of battle, IEW units normally receive a great degree of operator discretion to jam targets of opportunity (TO) upon recognition (other types of jamming are preplanned and on-call). The categories of TOs are usually planned, with the restriction that the frequency is not taboo, protected, or guarded.

Within these guidelines, certain procedures should be used.

1. T&A teams should **never** give blanket authority to individual operators to jam at will. Just like lethal artillery fires, jamming fires must be controlled in order to achieve maximum effect. The T&A team can maximize effects by careful management, execution, and synchronization of jamming.

2. The T&A team should determine what effect is desired. For example, the desired effect could be to—

- ☐ Enhance ES (forcing the enemy operator into the "red" [nonsecure communications], delaying his communications without his changing frequencies, or forcing a compromise of communications procedures).
- ☐ Disrupt/deny enemy communications (thus C²) by massing jamming fires.

3. The T&A team must know when to jam by using event-based analysis. Jamming an enemy company as it moves from an assembly area is not effective. However, jamming the company as it begins to take direct fires or breaches a minefield is highly effective. Thus, the enemy commander is denied C²

during a critical event.

4. An ES team must **always** be assigned to monitor EA effectiveness, chase the enemy through a frequency change, or gather intelligence if the effect is to enhance ES.




5. If the desired effect is to deny the enemy C³ (if friendly asset allocation allows), massive jamming should be brought to bear on the enemy in order to deny communications and force a frequency change. Every time a radio net has to change frequencies, subscribers are lost and the net shrinks. Consequently, the net may be split into three, four, or more parts. This is good, but the T&A team must be careful to direct primary jamming fires on the net that contains the net control station (NCS) in order to prevent net reconstitution. This requires the operators to be familiar with the enemy net control station (NCS) voice and call sign(s).

In conclusion, units which plan and train on procedures in these five general areas will greatly enhance their ability to conduct effective EW. Commanders, staffs, and soldiers at all levels should always plan and execute to cause a specific effect and should be confident in their ability to accomplish the mission.

1LT Paul T. Carter is a platoon leader and company operations officer for Charlie Company, 519TH MI BN (TE) (ABN), Fort Bragg, NC. He is a former enlisted 98C, and served with the 107th at Fort Ord, CA, and 703d at Schofield Barracks, HI. He was commissioned through Officer Candidate School.

Seeing the Light: A Graphic Technique



by Major Collin A. Agee

Desert Storm dramatically demonstrated the relative advantage American ground units enjoy when fighting at night. Iraqi survivors indicated that their first warning of night attack came when the first round impacted. We must ensure we retain and exploit this advantage in future conflicts.

In the January-March 1992 issue of *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett suggested an innovative, comprehensive way to present the commander's weather brief. This article proposes an alternative technique for displaying light data.

As the staff officer responsible for weather and light data, the intelligence officer can help the commander maximize the advantage of superior night-fighting capability. Unfortunately, intelligence estimates normally contain elaborate tables that take time to interpret. Briefings often consist of a single reference to that day's Ending Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT), Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT), and percent illumination. The Center for Army Lessons Learned noted that S2s at the National Training Center sometimes ignore light data; or, more frequently, present it as raw data.

The students of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth recently underwent a condensed Battle Command Training Program seminar followed by a Warfighter Exercise. During the seminar, retired General Cavazos, the Senior Observer/Controller, recounted a warfighter in which a helicopter unit lacking night vision equipment at-

tempted a night operation based on that evening's high percentage of illumination. Unfortunately the moon set before the mission began; illumination was 0 percent.

After hearing this vignette, the S2s obviously sought to avoid a similar mistake. Toward that end, they devised the light data graphic (Figure 1). As a division staff, they planned for an offensive mission in the Republic of Korea on August 22. Available data included lunar and solar tables from the corps intelligence estimate. The tables showed that we were approaching a full moon, with the moon up until just before BMNT. For the remainder of the operation, illumination was stronger and the moon was up virtually the entire night. The commander, eager to exploit his night superiority, was not thrilled with this information, but he knew exactly what light conditions prevailed without studying the tables.




Figure 1.

S2s may find this technique useful. At a glance, Figure 1 shows five sets of data: moonrise, moonset, BMNT, EENT, and percent illumination. It also highlights periods of darkness by shading. The S2 can quickly prepare the chart using nothing more than a straight edge, although graph paper makes it easier. I created Figure 1 in about 10 minutes using Power Point software.

For short periods of time, most of the data is

perature. Non-weather information can be integrated as well. Egyptian planners considered illumination along with water levels in the Suez Canal when planning to cross the canal during the 1973 October war. Figure 2 shows a slightly different display covering a 60-day period. This graphic could prove useful if the planner could choose the optimal date for an operation (or predict an optimal date for an enemy operation).




Figure 2.

roughly linear. Percent illumination follows a sine curve corresponding to the phases of the moon. BMNT and EENT are also sine waves, but with a period of a year rather than the lunar cycle of 29.5 days. At the tactical level, solar data approaches a nearly horizontal straight line.

Additional data is limited only by the needs of the graph's creator; although excessive data would soon render the graph unintelligible. If many sets of data are required, prepare multiple graphs, such as forecasts of precipitation or cloud cover, night vision goggle start and stop times, or even predicted tem-

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield has "made a lot of money" for MI officers by providing graphic intelligence to commanders. Our goal is to make the battlefield as comprehensible to the commander as possible, in a minimal amount of time. Toward that goal, the light data graphic may shed a little light on the subject.

MAJ Agee is currently the S3 for the 319th MI Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Agee has served 14 years on active duty, including assignments in the 4th ID, the 25th ID, and at NTC.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Commanders Drive STARPUBS

by James J. Adams

Editor's Note: Concepts and Doctrine is a new department designed to keep you informed of new concepts and doctrine developed at the Intelligence Center. The Directorate of Combat Developments provided a concepts article; however, the MIPB staff decided to print it as a feature.

The Doctrine and Publications Division at the Intelligence Center continues to receive numerous requests from "the field" for field manuals. Many of these requests are for DA-authenticated manuals provided through the Standard Army Publication System (STARPUBS), commonly known as pinpoint distribution.

Individuals requesting manuals from this office often say, "The pinpoint system doesn't work." However, this office has had no difficulty obtaining the manuals we need through the pinpoint system. Pinpoint distribution works for us because we make it work.

Commanders should make every effort to ensure the pinpoint system works for their units. They should take a personal interest in ensuring their units receive the doctrinal and training publications needed for training. Commanders must pursue this goal with the same enthusiasm they use to requisition equipment, personnel, and other materiel needed to execute their unit's mission.

The **Publications Bulletin** (winter 1993) contains a detailed discussion of how to review your DA Form 12-Series publications accounts. Publication account holders should review their DA Form 12-Series subscription requirements at least once a year. Now is a perfect time to conduct this review.

Step 1

Obtain a copy of your DA Form 12-Series requirements. Account holders may request a current printout of their initial distribution requirements (DA Form 12-Series) by using one of the following methods:

- ☐ Contact the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center at DSN 584-3975 or Commercial 410-682-8528.

- ☐ Send your request through the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). Use the content indicator code "AGZP."
- ☐ Mail your request to Commander, U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, ATTN: ASQZ-BDC, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896.

The record format for your 12-Series printout request is your publication account number in positions 1 through 5 of your data record. For example: A0001 (**nothing follows the last digit of your number**). After you submit a DA Form 12-Series update, you automatically receive a new printout showing your account profile after all changes have been made.

Step 2

Validate your subscription requirements.

Step 3

Update your subscription requirements. To update, identify the appropriate DA Form 12-Series form and block numbers. **DA Pam 25-30, Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms**, is the authoritative source for DA Form 12-Series form and block numbers. Do not use the form and block numbers cited in the distribution statement printed in a publication unless they are validated against this index. Once you have identified your quantity requirements by DA Form 12-Series form and block numbers, submit them using one of the following methods:

- ☐ Complete a DA Form 12-99R, Standard Army Publications System 12-Series Subscription Change Sheet (the only form you can use to change your subscription requirements). Mail it to the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center.
- ☐ Send the subscription requirements through AUTODIN. Use the content indicator code "AGZK" and forward it to the same address used for publications requisitions.

Commanders make it happen.

Jim Adams is the Chief of the Doctrinal Literature Branch, Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine, at the Intelligence Center. He can be reached at DSN 821-2676 or 602-533-2676.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

George W. Howell, Jr.
Command Sergeant Major (Retired)

MI Corps Hall of Fame Member
Distinguished Member of the Corps
First Honorary Command Sergeant Major

In 1954, George W. Howell, Jr., entered the Army as a machine gunner with the 502d Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. During more than 30 years of service in the U.S. Army, he progressed from the rank of private to become the senior enlisted soldier in Army Intelligence.

Significant assignments include duty with field artillery, airborne, special forces, signal, and MI units in Germany, Thailand, Vietnam, Hawaii, and the continental United States. From 1972 to 1975, he served successively as senior enlisted instructor, operations sergeant, first sergeant, and sergeant major in the 3d School Battalion, and command sergeant major of the 2d School Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca.

Command Sergeant Major Howell served from 1975 to 1978 in the 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii, as G2 sergeant major and command sergeant major



of the 125th Signal Battalion. From 1978 to 1982, he was command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Command, Adelphi, Maryland; and the Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

Command Sergeant Major Howell's final assignment was as command sergeant major, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command from 1982 until his retirement in 1985.

(Continued from page 14)



Image 4

- ☐ Intelligence and operational planning.
- ☐ Tactical support to the execution of subordinate unit missions.

Conclusion

An image received at the right time and place, and in the right format is worth a thousand words. Imagery is an important contributor to all-source intelligence at strategic, operational, and tactical levels because it can reveal—

- ☐ Armor and troop strength.
- ☐ Tactical deployments and locations of re-

serves.

- ☐ Command and control centers.
- ☐ Terrain information.
- ☐ Lines of communication.
- ☐ Nuclear, biological, and chemical delivery means.
- ☐ Fortifications and obstacles.

In the debate between supplying hard-copy imagery and written reports, I would personally rather receive a hard-copy image. Often an imagery analyst is pressed for time and can only answer specific questions in response to a specific request. Sometimes this focus masks the "forest for the trees."

A good example of this occurred during Operation Market Garden in World War II. Imagery analysts were asked to locate suitable drop zones. The analysts found them, but did not detect German tanks in the tree lines. Had the planners or soldiers themselves been able to look at the imagery, they might have detected, recognized, and identified the tanks.

CPT Dan Smith, USAR, is assigned to G2 Operations, 29th Infantry Division.

(Continued from page 27)

location on the battlefield in relation to time and space. He accomplishes this by successfully predicting the enemy's rate of movement. Therefore, it is critical that these predictions are as accurate as possible. The AEAM is a tool intelligence officers can use to increase their accuracy and predictive capabilities.

During the battle, the AEAM will help the G2/S2 or SIO track and predict enemy movement rates, future locations for high value targets, and the arrival of enemy forces. By updating the matrix to reflect the actual speed of a force, the intelligence officer can continuously revise predictions of future enemy

locations. This data is used to refine targeting, initiate counterattacks, and begin other operation plans.

The AEAM is useful for all G2/S2s or SIOs from battalion to corps levels. When used with intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products, this will help synchronize intelligence and create a common understanding of the enemy.

To obtain a copy of the AEAM and a memorandum of instruction on disk, contact 1st ID(M) G2 Plans, Captain Ken Krumm, DSN: 856-2918, or use our E-Mail address, RIL1.AFZNGSP.

CPT Krumm is the Assistant G2 Plans Officer, 1st ID, Fort Riley KS.

(Continued from page 27)

support in the use of E-mail. If possible, each staff officer and subordinate commander should attend the training or send a computer operator or Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO).

Once you are on-line with E-mail, make sure someone in your office checks the mail at least daily and replies when necessary. Print out the important mail and empty the mailbox or it will quickly fill up with old mail.

Shareware

Shareware happens to be a good deal. In addition, it is software with an honor system. Programmers from across the country write programs without any copyright restrictions. Most popular Shareware is of high caliber and rivals commercial software. It can be copied and exchanged freely. You can try it out for 30 days and if you like it, mail the author a nominal fee (usually from \$5 to \$30); if not,

just erase the program. Shareware is available from many local computer Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) or CompuServe. Your DOIM and DAMO are also good sources of Shareware information. See your neighborhood computer store for BBS phone numbers and instructions on how to connect using BBS.

Scanners

Did you ever have to put together a "smart book" (an enemy equipment, order of battle, or doctrine book)? In Windows you can scan the image in, move it to the Paintbrush program to refine it, and then move it to a WINDOWS word processor. A hand scanner can help you tailor your "smart book" or view graph for your unit. The only limit is your imagination.

CPT Conti is assigned to the National Systems Development Program, 743d MI Battalion, Fort Meade, MD. His E-mail address is CONTI@ACM.ORG (75260,1350 on CompuServe).

(Continued from page 23)

- ☐ Protect and develop the defense industrial complex.

Ongoing Debate

Certain aspects of the doctrine reflect ongoing internal debates over Russian security issues. One debate is over the level of defense spending. All officials want to maintain a viable military R&D and production capability. They differ on how much to spend on this requirement.

There is also an ongoing debate over the near-abroad policy. The doctrine reflects Yeltsin's emphasis on nonmilitary means to resolve national security problems. Certain elements of the document, however, suggest that Russia may use the armed forces to intervene in the near-abroad on behalf of ethnic Russians.

Conclusion

Russia's new military doctrine reflects the continuing debate within Russia over defining national interests, determining how strong the military must be to protect its interests, and how much to rely on military means to accomplish national security goals. How the doctrine will be implemented, and whether it will be contrary to the interests of the West, will depend on who is in power in Moscow.

Dr. Arnett has been a Soviet/Russian analyst at DA, ODCSI, since 1980, and had previously served on the Army Staff's Red Team. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Ohio State University in 1979. Arnett served on active duty at ASA HQ and has served in an MI Reserve unit. He has published numerous articles on the Soviet/Russian Armed Forces and on Russian civil-military relations.

TOTAL FORCE



An effort is underway to restructure the Reserve Component (RC) MI force so it is more accessible and useful in today's environment. The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Army RC, Army National Guard (ARNG), Intelligence and Security Command, and MI Proponent are all involved in this effort. Army leadership has directed the MI Proponent to do a Force Design Update focusing on RC and ARNG MI units.

A New Focus

The catalyst for this initiative is the recently published **FM 100-5, Operations**. Central to the MI focus is a change in requirements, the need for force projection, the acknowledgment of joint or coalition structures, and the move toward a more continental United States-based force. These factors drive the necessity for a split-based operations capability.

Technology has made our goals attainable, with portable satellite relays and Global Positioning Systems a reality. Desktop computers replace capabilities that once were housed in vans and fixed sites. Now the challenge is how to bring all the data from diverse sources into a common picture, modify the picture at will, and then share it with all of our customers at various echelons.

Organizationally, we have reassessed how to support the warfighter with an MI force that uses all the disciplines. We cannot afford an attitude of "lower echelons never trust higher echelons." This has resulted in a duplication of capabilities.

We must ensure non-organic MI units can focus on the supported warfighter and leverage the capability to focus on the critical point in time and space. We also need to consider our MI force through the depth of its components: Active Component (AC), USAR, ARNG, and Component 4 (programmed but not resourced).

As America's Army downsizes, the USAR and ARNG will comprise a larger percentage of the total force. We must make better use of our RC MI force; it must be driven by requirements. We cannot simply mirror the AC MI force. The relationship between the AC and RC must be strengthened. RC capabilities should be leveraged in peace, crisis, and war. Finally, we must provide the RC MI force the connectivity and processing capacity that will allow it to

train effectively and to contribute to the intelligence mission. In future issues we will address the process that will move these units into the 21st century.

RC MI Directory

The updated **Directory of RC MI Units and Sections** is available on diskette. To obtain your copy, send a formatted disk and a self-addressed padded mailing envelope with two 29-cent stamps on it to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. POC is Bill Manning, DSN 821-1584 or 602-533-1584.

RC MIOAC

This year the 6th U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF)-Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca will conduct Phase II of the new RC MIOAC. The course trains USAR and ARNG officers as battalion or brigade S2s and staff officers responsible for managing IEW assets and systems. The course has a correspondence phase and a two-week resident phase. To be eligible, officers must have completed either MIOBC or another branch officer basic course and the MI Officer Transition Course (AC or RC). Applicants for Phase II must have completed RC MIOAC Phase I and have a secret clearance with a special background investigation opened.

97L Update

The first 97L Translator Interpreter Course begins this June. The 6th USARF-Intelligence School will teach three classes—one each in Spanish, Japanese, and German. The new MOS is RC-unique with all 45 students coming from the ARNG's 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) for the two-week reclassification training. The incoming students are already language qualified. The 97L course will train them to be effective translators and interpreters.

ARNG G2/S2 Workshop

An ARNG G2/S2 workshop is tentatively scheduled for October 21. The focus will be on IEW equipment and training. POC is LTC Dave Miner.

COL John Craig is Chief, Reserve Forces Office, LTC Dave Miner is ARNG advisor. Their numbers are DSN 821-1176/1177 or 602-533-1176-1177, FAX DSN 821-1762 or 602-533-1762.

PROPONENT NOTES



Warrant Officer Notes

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) is seeking applicants for the Warrant Officer Program. Particularly short are MOSs 351B, 351E, and 352C. Applicants for any MI MOS must—

- ☐ Be a U.S. citizen, have a GT score of 110 or higher, and be a high school or GED graduate.
- ☐ Have a Secret clearance before attending the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).
- ☐ Be at least sergeant (E5) and a BNCOC graduate.
- ☐ Have at least 5 years' active federal service but no more than 12. (This is waiverable.)
- ☐ Have four years' operational experience with at least two assignments in the MOS.
- ☐ Not be subject to the Quality Management Program or nearing a retention control point.

These are the available MI warrant officer specialties and enlisted feeder MOSs: 350B, 96B; 350D, 96D; 350L, 71L (with ASI E4); 351C, see AR 614-115, MI Officer Excepted Career Program; 351E, 97E; 352C, 98C; 352D 98D; 352G, 98G; 352H, 98H; 352J, 98J; 352K, 98K; and 353A, all CMF 33 MOSs.

DA Circular 601-91-XX, Warrant Officer Procurement (now in revision), gives the guidance for assembling the warrant officer application packet. You will need the following forms and materials:

- ☐ DA Form 61, Application for Appointment.
- ☐ DA Form 160, Application for Active Duty.
- ☐ DD Form 398, Personnel Security Questionnaire.
- ☐ Endorsements from your company and battalion commanders.
- ☐ Endorsements from chief warrant officers in your MOS (not required but highly recommended).
- ☐ Statement of security clearance.
- ☐ Personal resume and full-length DA photo.
- ☐ Certified copies of DA Forms 2 and 2-1.
- ☐ DA Form 330, Language Proficiency Questionnaire. (Your Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score cannot be over six months old when the application is received.)
- ☐ Certified copies of college or university diplomas and transcripts.

- ☐ Copies of diplomas from MOS-producing courses, noncommissioned officer education system courses, and functional courses directly related to the warrant MOS for which you are applying.

When you have assembled the packet, forward it through your local MILPO to HQ USAREC. After USAREC ensures your packet is complete, it forwards it to OCMI for proponent review.

If the applicant is not technically qualified, OCMI returns the packet to USAREC with an explanation of the problem. After OCMI ensures the packets meet minimum prerequisites, they return them to USAREC for screening by an accessions board.

Although accessions boards convene throughout the year, every board does not review MI packets. The board consists of a president (a lieutenant colonel) and six senior warrant officers. When MI applicants are boarded, only one of the board members will be from the MI branch. The other members will be only vaguely familiar with MI duty titles and operations. Therefore, the board focuses on common soldier skills and proficiencies.

Board members look closely at the official photo, APFT scores (strive for 250 and above), civilian education (the more college credits the better), diverse assignments in leadership positions, and high DLPT scores. Letters of recommendation from warrant officers in the MOS you're applying for are extremely important and carry more weight than other letters of recommendation.

Frequently, selection for the WOCS is a matter of numbers. If there are more positions than applicants, the chances of selection are almost 100 percent. However, there are usually more applicants than positions, and the process is highly competitive. Only applicants with the best records are selected.

Selected soldiers are notified two to three weeks after the board adjourns. Qualified soldiers who are not selected are also notified, and their packets are held for screening at the next accessions board. If soldiers are not selected a second time, they cannot reapply until a year from the date of nonselection.

MW4 Jeff Platt is the new OCMI Warrant Officer Professional Development Manager. His number is DSN 821-1183 or 602-533-1183.

To contact USAREC directly, call DSN 464-0820/0832/8779 or 502-624-0820/0832/8779; or write to Commander, USAREC, ATTN: RCRO-SM-O, Fort Knox, KY 40121. Include your name, rank, primary MOS, unit address, years of active federal service, and return address with any written request.

USAREC is also seeking qualified soldiers to apply for warrant officer training as Army aviators. Applicants for this specialty must meet several nonwaiverable prerequisites: be a U.S. citizen, have a GT score of 110 or above, be a high school or GED graduate, have a Secret clearance before attending WOCS, be at least 18 but less than 29 years old before selection for this training, pass a Class I flight physical, and score 30 or above on the Alternate Flight Aptitude Selection Test.

CMF 96

MOS 96H. With the deactivation of the OV-1D Mohawk at the end of FY 96 and the fielding of the Joint STARS ground station module, MOS 96H will be revised. Soldiers who hold MOS 96H will be coded with ASI Y2. ASI Y2 will identify them as Aerial Intelligence Specialists who need to be retrained as Imagery Ground Station Operators (IGSO). After completion of the new 96H training, ASI Y2 will be removed and replaced with ASI 1B. ASI 1B will identify soldiers with IGSO training who are also trained to support the OV-1D mission. The first IGSO AIT Course will start in September.

MOS 97B. A change of terminology is being written into MOS 97B. The title Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) has been changed to Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). The new title aptly describes the counterintelligence (CI) function of source operations in the tactical CI force protection mission. **AR 381-XX, Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source Operations** (to be published in July), regulates CFSO. The first CFSO class will start in October 1995. The necessity of a CFSO ASI has not been determined.

CMF 98 Restructure

Since the Restructure Task Force moved here last August, the Intelligence Center has reviewed all task force documents and identified areas that need to be addressed. Meetings have been held with Intelligence Center personnel, subject matter experts, and INSCOM representatives to discuss these concerns.

The consensus is that additional field input is necessary to ensure all concerns are addressed.

The task force sent messages to the field requesting input on current threat, future threat, future missions, and current and future skills. Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Hall also sent a message to all MI CSMs and G2 sergeants major (SGMs) requesting they bring their input to the CSM/SGM Conference. The conference was held February 14-17, and their input is now being considered.

In the meantime, a new proposal is being staffed within the Intelligence Center and selected commands for approval. The proposal has two major areas of concern:

- ☐ **MOS 98H.** MOS 98D will merge into MOS 98H. MOS 98H will also be responsible for the 98K Morse/Printer mission.
- ☐ **MOSs 98J, 98K, 98C, 98G.** These will remain unchanged pending further study.

Everyone agrees that it's a good idea to merge MOS 98D into MOS 98H. However, there are concerns about merging MOS 98J and MOS 98K, such as separating operational and technical electronic intelligence from MOS 98J. For more information, call Master Sergeant Sames or Sergeant First Class McIntyre, DSN 821-1450/1451, 602-533-1450/1451.

CMF 33

We here in OCMI often wish we had a crystal ball. However, we can tell you that the Intelligence Center is forming a subject matter expert panel to conduct a front-end analysis of CMF 33. This data will be used to determine in what direction our career field should march with a possible restructure.

MOS 33Y is overstrength due to the closure of field stations. Another issue in the future is the transfer of maintenance at Field Station Kunia, Hawaii, from the Army to the Navy. While present figures indicate that MOS 33Y will "balance out" during FY 95, assignment potential for these soldiers will be minimal. This, in turn, impacts on career progression. Three options exist:

- ☐ Leave the CMF as it is.
- ☐ Merge MOSs 33T and 33Y to create an Electronic Warfare/Intelligence (EW/I) ground systems repair MOS.
- ☐ Merge MOS 33T, 33R, and 33Y to create a single repair MOS.

Before we make a decision, we need to consider—

- ☐ What is the status of systems today and what will be the status in 10 years?
- ☐ How "open" will open architecture be when maintaining different types of platforms?

- ☐ Can we merge MOSs without overwhelming the soldier with equipment oriented critical tasks?
- ☐ What impact would changing our training strategy to a holistic maintenance training approach have, especially on staffing for force structure?

We want to avoid a restructure that has to be adjusted in five years because we didn't consider all possible factors. OCMI will continue to keep you posted on the changing situation.

Maintenance Training Division's transfer from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca is well underway. The division will be operational here by the end of summer.

MI Propensity Bulletin Board

Watch for a message announcing the MI Propensity Bulletin Board Service (BBS). The BBS will have all the latest news for all CMFs, along with information for MI officers, warrant officers, and civilians. The BBS will also be a way for you to send comments without having to use PROFS or E-Mail.

Language

In January, PERSCOM clarified a portion of the Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) policy as follows:

Effective immediately, soldiers who are attending refresher, intermediate, or advanced language training (not unit language refresher training) will not be tested in the language being taught until the training is complete. Soldiers in training who are already proficient in more than one additional language, and/or who are receiving FLPP in other languages, require recertification in the other language(s), if the DA Form 330 will expire while the soldier is in training. The restriction on taking the language test applies only in the language in which the soldier is currently being trained; the FLPP (for the old language) will continue uninterrupted at the same rate while the soldier is in training. For all other soldier-linguists,

the yearly requirement to be tested on the DLPT (in order to receive FLPP in a required language) remains valid. Orders authorizing FLPP are effective for not longer than 12 months from the evaluation date on the DA Form 330.

MOS 97L. The first two-week transition courses for MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter, for the Reserve Component, will start this June. These courses will be conducted almost entirely in Spanish, German, and Japanese. Transition course students are prior service soldiers who have an MOS other than 97L and have scored a minimum DLPT of 2-2.

Upon completion of the Transition Course, MOS 97L becomes the primary MOS; the former MOS becomes the secondary MOS. The DLPT must be taken within a year of the 97L transition course start date. Students in the first transition courses are in the 300th MI Brigade (National Guard) (Linguist), and its subordinate battalions. We may also expand MOS 97L to MI or other proponent USAR units.

Next year, the Intelligence Center plans to conduct 97L transition courses as well as four-week 97L AIT courses. The AIT courses will depend on recruiting language qualified enlistees in those languages.

Direct Combat Position Coding

The Secretary of Defense recently announced changes in the definition of direct ground combat and assignment rules for women soldiers. Based on these changes, and subject to Secretary of Defense approval, the Army will inform Congress of its intent to open maneuver brigade headquarters, division forward support battalions (forward maintenance support teams), and collection and jamming companies (MI battalions) among other units.

The MI Proponent has also recommended that the Army open all MI units to women; however, MOS 96R remains closed. If this recommendation is approved, only positions in maneuver battalions and Special Forces units (battalion level and below) will remain closed to MI women.

TRAINING NOTES

Military Intelligence Gunnery

by Lieutenant Colonel Maxie McFarland and Captains Gregg Potter and Douglas Smith

Ask commanders to describe what they want from intelligence and you will always hear two words in their discussion: accuracy and timeliness. Accuracy

and timeliness refer to several critical aspects of intelligence: collection including direction finding (DF), reporting, and analysis. Because of their importance accuracy and timeliness are focal points in all intelligence training.

There are many good training programs that try

to address the issues of accuracy and timeliness. However, none of these address the full scope of accuracy and timeliness in a single training program. For this reason, the 312th MI Battalion developed a cyclic training plan to address this issue. We discovered that a semiannual modification of tank gunnery combined with published intelligence training guidelines, was the best solution. We call our program MI gunnery.

Levels and Tables

Like tank gunnery, MI gunnery consists of various levels and tables. MI gunnery is a five-level program designed to train echelons crew through battalion. Levels I through III focus on crew through company level tasks. Levels IV and V focus on battalion level tasks, and incorporate jamming. This article addresses levels I, II, and III in detail. Although MI gunnery was developed specifically for intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems, it can be adapted to evaluate all assets within the MI battalion. The 312th MI Battalion is developing gunnery tables for ground surveillance radar and long-range surveillance detachments.

Levels I, II, and III are excellent programs for preparing an IEW company to deploy, fight, and win at the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center, or Combined Maneuver Training Center. MI gunnery validates training, but it is not a substitute for a company training program. To be successful, crews must have a thorough knowledge of crew drill procedures before beginning MI gunnery.

Each level of the gunnery program can stand alone and doesn't have to be conducted in sequence. Our gunnery program is based on an NTC scenario that uses scripted message traffic (similar to traffic encountered at the NTC) from reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance, movement to contact, hasty attack, and defensive missions.

Each level builds on skills learned in previous levels and the program may be tailored based on the commander's assessment. Crews will not advance to the next table without meeting the standard. Leaders must be present during the conduct of MI gunnery to provide feedback to soldiers and to demand that every task is done to standard. MI gunnery's training philosophy is simple: study and follow the doctrinal principles outlined in FM 25-101, **Battle Focused Training**. Ensure that gunnery preparation and execution follow the training sequence of: plan and prepare, reconnaissance and rehearse, issue the order, execute, conduct after action review, and retrain until the standard is met.

Level I

Level I gunnery trains and qualifies crews. It is based on a known distance range concept. Crews boresight their system during level I, thus optimizing system accuracy. Level I consists of four tables. At the conclusion of level I, crews will be able to: set up, bring their system into operation, collect, report, and understand the effects of terrain on system accuracy.

Although specifically designed to train crews, level I can train the platoon operations center (POC) transcription and analysis (T&A) teams in analysis and asset management. The POC can analyze information the teams report and determine the best sites for asset location. Level I's goal is to qualify crews, boresight the system, and remove human error from the collection and direction finding process.

Level I takes approximately 10 training days to complete. Adequate time must be allocated for retraining as required. Level I requires nine targets and a training area large enough to deploy targets to a range of 21 kilometers. Crews receive a mission briefing before beginning each table that includes target locations, radio frequencies, and transmission times.

Table I trains crews to deploy, bring their system into operation, and collect against "close-in" targets. Table I is conducted in daylight and time standards are not applied. Crews deploy to one of four preselected sites (reverse slope, forward slope, elevated, depression), set up using established crew drill procedures, collect against three targets each at ranges of 5, 8, and 12 kilometers.

Crews can calculate the accuracy of lines of bearing because both the system and target location are known. Crews will not progress to table II until they can set up, collect, and produce lines of bearing within established standards.

Table II is a long distance intercept and line of bearing table. Crews train the same objectives as table I; however, targets are at ranges of 15, 18, and 24 kilometers.

Table III is a daylight qualification table. Given a location and collection mission, crews deploy and bring the system into operation according to established crew drills. Crews must collect and provide lines of bearing (if applicable) against nine targets at distances of 5, 12, and 18 kilometers. To qualify, a crew must have their system into operation within established time limits, acquire eight of nine possible targets, and provide lines of bearing within established standards.

Table IV is the night qualification table. This table is set up the same as table III. Crews must meet the same standard as table III; however, time limits are

adjusted to accommodate for limited visibility.

Level II

Level II gunnery trains baseline operations. It reinforces all level I skills while laying the foundation for platoon and company IEW operations. Level II validates the effectiveness of different baseline types and the ability of systems and T&A teams to net and produce accurate fixes. At the conclusion of level II, systems and T&A teams will be able to: establish baselines based on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), optimize DF accuracy, acquire targets, and provide fixes within established standards.

Level II requires seven training days and consists of four tables. Twelve targets are employed at ranges of 5, 12, 18, and 24 kilometers. Target locations and the forward line of own troops (FLOT) do not change during this level. The company team receives a mission briefing before each table that includes target locations, target frequencies, and the location of the FLOT. The company team can calculate DF accuracy because they know the location of each system and target.

Table V employs a linear baseline. This table verifies the strengths and weaknesses of the linear baseline. Systems deploy according to established crew drills to linear positions directed by the T&A team. Systems and the T&A team net and begin collection/DF operations. Systems generate reports based on intercepts and pass them to the T&A team. The T&A team calculates DF accuracy and provides feedback to the systems. The team will not progress to the next table until DF accuracy is within established standards.

Table VI employs a convex baseline, **Table VII** employs the concave baseline, and **Table VIII** employs an echelon baseline given the same conditions and standards as **Table V**.

Level III

Level III gunnery exercises skills learned in previous levels, and trains T&A teams in nodal analysis and collection management. Level III uses a doctrinal threat array which is doctrinally positioned on the battlefield according to an electronic order of battle. Level III's goal is to provide accurate and timely targeting information and identification. At the conclusion of level III, T&A teams will be able to: select the appropriate baseline configuration, direct collection efforts (general search and directed search plans), identify threat communications nets, produce net diagrams, and track threat movement.

Level III consists of four tables and requires eight training days. The required number of targets de-

pends on the net portrayed. General target locations and frequency ranges are provided to the T&A team; however, detailed information on frequencies and locations must be obtained through IEW operations.

Table IX trains collection against threat command and control nets. Targets portray a division C² net. T&A teams must decide which baseline to use based on IPB. Systems deploy, establish the baseline, net, and begin collection operations based on the T&A team's general search parameters. The T&A team prepares a net diagram based on reports from the baseline. Then the T&A team must task the baseline to fill intelligence gaps. At the conclusion of this table, an accurate net diagram must be established and threat locations identified. Teams must meet the standard to progress to the next table.

Table X targets collection against threat artillery nets, **Table XI** targets threat air defense nets, and **Table XII** targets threat reconnaissance (systems must track movement of reconnaissance assets during this table) using the same conditions and standards as **Table IX**.

Levels IV and V

Levels IV and V gunnery trains battalion operations. It takes three training days to complete each level. All IEW systems are simultaneously employed in a baseline. Jamming systems assist collectors in general search and tip-off until tasked to perform a jamming mission. The technical control and analysis element (TCAE) performs asset management, mission management, and analytical support. Levels IV and V build upon skills trained in previous levels and introduce movement of assets and the baseline, integration of assets, tip-off, spot and barrage jamming, and reacquisition of targets after jamming. The goal of levels IV and V is to mold the MI battalion into a synchronized IEW team.

Levels IV and V are resource intensive. They require a training area large enough to deploy the MI battalion and numerous targets in doctrinal configurations. Only one net is portrayed in level IV while multiple nets are used in level V. During both levels, target locations and frequencies are unknown. The TCAE must deploy the baseline based on IPB. Assets must find, fix, jam, and reacquire targets. The TCAE must identify the target net, refine collection tasking, and adjust the baseline to fill intelligence gaps. Level V may be incorporated into a battalion Army Training and Evaluation Program.

QUICKFIX

QUICKFIX is a critical member of the IEW team. It is the division commander's long-range collection

asset and, as such, must be fully integrated into the division IEW operations. MI gunnery levels II through V are excellent programs for improving QUICKFIX crew skills. QUICKFIX can fire these tables independently, or while netted with TRAILBLAZER.

The Bottom Line

Gunnery takes a unique approach to the difficult task of training intelligence professionals. Successfully completing gunnery validates a unit's ability to complete its wartime IEW mission to standard. The

ultimate goal of MI gunnery is to give soldiers, crews, and the commander a measure of the systems' and unit's ability to find, track, DF, identify, and report targets across the battlefield in an accurate and timely manner. Training deficiencies discovered during gunnery will help the commander develop future training plans. A properly executed gunnery program will ensure all IEW mission essential tasks will be trained and executed to standard.

LTC McFarland is the Division G2 for the 2d Armor Division, Fort Hood, TX; CPT Smith is serving in the 902d MI Battalion; and CPT Potter is the S2 for 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

Delta Seeks Intelligence NCOs

The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, Fort Bragg, is currently recruiting NCOs in MOSs 96B, 96D, and 97B.

Intelligence NCOs at Delta perform a variety of tactical and operational functions directly related to the accomplishment of Delta's rapid response, special operations missions. These positions are characterized by a high level of individual responsibility, access to national level intelligence systems, and a worldwide mission.

Successful applicants in MOSs 96B and 96D must have good analytical skills, a strong practical background in either tactical or strategic intelligence, and the ability to write and brief well. Area specialization and language skills are helpful but not required. MOS 97B applicants should have a strong tactical background, with strategic level counterintelligence experience.

Intelligence NCOs who complete a tour of duty at Delta find they are well prepared for intelligence po-

sitions at either the tactical or strategic level, involving either analytical or leadership roles. They are also highly competitive with their peers.

Prerequisites for MOSs 96B, 96D, and 97B are grade E6 or E7 (waiverable to E5); minimum GT score of 115; minimum four years' time in service; minimum three years' intelligence experience; possess, or able to obtain, TS/SCI clearance; no limiting physical profile, above-average performance with no history of recurring disciplinary action; and volunteer for airborne training if not airborne qualified.

Intelligence NCOs who meet these prerequisites and want an application packet should call SGM Gary Smith, DSN 236-0620 or 919-396-0620, or write to Commander, 1st SFOD-D (Abn), ATTN: SGM Smith/ASE, P.O. Box 70149, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Qualified applicants will be considered for additional testing and interviews after their completed packets are reviewed.

VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 3)

future action. Frequent counseling is always a positive leadership tool.

We must all "dig down deep" on some occasions to enforce the standards of leadership and discipline. At any given time, all of us have a tendency to overlook soldiers who: drop a piece of trash, walk to their car without headgear, do not salute an officer properly, or do not answer with the appropriate respect. These violations are the result of a lack of discipline, which reflects on these soldiers' leadership during their time in the military.

In this period of great change in the Army, it is easy to let leadership and discipline take a "back seat." However, it is more important now than ever

before to keep our standards high. These leadership principles have made us the most powerful fighting force in the world. They also taught us the necessity of compassion when providing humanitarian aid to the enemy, as was the case after Desert Storm. We must continue to instill these principles of leadership and discipline in our soldiers. This is not an easy task, but I believe that working together we will be successful.

In my first article for MIPB, I told you of my high expectations of all soldiers in the Corps. I also told you I would set the example for all of you. I will continue to strive toward this goal for our entire MI Corps.

Always remember: "NCOs Lead the Way," and they always lead from the front!

Green-to-Gold: Future Officers From Today's Enlisted Ranks

by Captain Greg Lane, USAR

Green-to-Gold is an Army ROTC program that offers active duty enlisted soldiers an early discharge, under Chapter 16, AR 635-200, **Enlisted Personnel**, to earn a bachelor's degree and an officer's commission. Soldiers are discharged to attend college, taking both academic courses and Army ROTC courses. After graduation, they are commissioned with a bachelor's degree.

Soldiers in MI MOSs make great Green-to-Gold candidates because of their high GT scores, good high school (or college) records, and specialized training that often qualifies them for college credits.

As part of the Green-to-Gold Program, soldiers may be eligible for college scholarships.

Four-Year Scholarship

For a four-year scholarship, soldiers must—

- ☐ Have an SAT score of at least 850 or an ACT score of at least 19.
- ☐ Be accepted by a historically black college or university offering Army ROTC and by the Army ROTC department at that school.
- ☐ Have at least two years of active duty when discharged to start college.
- ☐ Be recommended by both your company and battalion commanders.
- ☐ Be no older than 26 at graduation with two years of active duty, no older than 27 with three years of active duty, and no older than 28 with four or more years of active duty.
- ☐ Pass a medical examination.

Two- or Three-Year Scholarship

For a two/three-year scholarship, soldiers must—

- ☐ Have a GT score of 115 or higher and a college GPA of 2.5 or higher.
- ☐ Be accepted by any school offering Army ROTC and by the Army ROTC department at that school.
- ☐ Have at least two years of active duty when discharged to start college.
- ☐ Meet the same four-year scholarship requirements for recommendations, age, and medical examination.

Nonscholarship Option

For the non-scholarship option, soldiers must—

- ☐ Have two years of college, a GT score of 110 or higher, and a GPA score of 2.0 or higher.

- ☐ Be accepted by any school offering Army ROTC and by the ROTC department of that school.
- ☐ Have at least two years of active duty when discharged to start college.
- ☐ Be recommended by your company commander.
- ☐ Pass a medical examination.
- ☐ Be no older than 29 at graduation (waiverable up to age 32).

A Great Opportunity

Scholarship students receive \$8,000 per school year, or 80 percent of their tuition, whichever is greater. They also get a book allowance of \$225 per semester, or \$150 per quarter, and a monthly subsistence allowance of \$100 during the school year.

Nonscholarship students receive a monthly subsistence allowance of \$100 during the school year, as well as the opportunity to serve in a National Guard or Army Reserve unit as a cadet, drawing E5 pay. This option is not open to scholarship students.

Soldiers can draw their veterans benefits while in Army ROTC if they have served the minimum time to qualify—at least 30 months of their enlistment. If soldiers have participated in the Army College Fund, they qualify for that money as well; however, the fund money is prorated according to the percentage of time served on their enlistment.


The service obligation after commissioning is eight years, which can be served on active duty (if selected), or in the Army Reserve or National Guard.

Green-to-Gold cadets do very well (one was the top cadet in the nation in 1989). They bring maturity and a breadth of experience to our ROTC program. In four of the last five years, every qualified soldier who applied was awarded a scholarship.

For more information, contact the Army ROTC department nearest you. Each stateside installation, including Alaska and Hawaii, has a nearby Army ROTC department responsible for providing Green-to-Gold coverage to that installation. If you do not know where the nearest ROTC department is, call 1-800-USA-ROTC for assistance. If you are overseas, contact your nearest education center and the Army ROTC department of your school of choice.

CPT Lane is a Reserve officer attached to the Army ROTC department at Austin Peay State University. He previously served 12 years on active duty and is a 1981 graduate of the Citadel.

PROFESSIONAL READER



Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft
by Adda Bozeman (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey's, Inc., 1993) 259 pages, \$32.

This book confronts the United States' ability to gather intelligence on non-Western countries. It examines various political and cultural aspects of statecraft and political intelligence. The most profound assertion the author makes is that the West does not understand the value systems of other cultures. Consequently, these countries engage in behavior Americans can't understand.

Bozeman points out that Islamic countries look upon armed conflict differently than Western countries. She further suggests that Americans should learn about and attempt to understand these differing views of armed conflict. The book identifies the problem saying that it adversely affects America's ability to conduct policy and to interact with these countries. Unfortunately, Bozeman fails to offer remedies. Further, because the text is a collection of essays, the novice will find it difficult to understand the key concepts.

The author contends that since successful policy depends on good intelligence, America must increase its intelligence capability and pursue long-range policy objectives. The challenge of the 21st century is to modify intelligence to counter military threats—an increasingly difficult task.

Adda Bozeman has the advantage of being trained in foreign cultures and political science. She argues that the U.S. and the West did not understand these differences in colonial times, and have yet to develop the training programs needed to cope with them now.

The Cold War overshadowed any need for studying other cultures. Bozeman candidly declares that the U.S. does

not understand the cultures of Africa, Asia, or Latin America, and for that reason, cannot "deal" with them effectively. She advocates a series of multidiscipline and comparative studies on the history and cultures of these countries. Norms and values dominant in a society's inner order are inevitably operational in that society's relations with the outside world.

Bozeman advises Americans to think more in geopolitical terms and less in legal terms and to emphasize the assessment of cultural, rather than official, territorial frontiers. She also recommends that the U.S. recognize the North-South and East-West fault lines as continental Europe's, thus the West's, geostrategically important boundaries. The West must ensure the security of its borderlands against inroads by adversarial cultures. The West must, she insists, track the interactions between divergent idea systems, since these provide the underpinnings for all wars.

This is a wonderful book for students of political science, political intelligence, and policy formation. It is not designed to forward any particular policy; rather, it attempts to influence academia and indirectly change thinking, perception, and policy formation.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF
San Antonio, TX

Making War: The 200-Year-Old Battle Between the President and Congress Over How America Goes To War by John Lehman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992) 297 pages, \$24.

John Lehman draws on his experiences in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations to provide an insider's account of the way Americans go to war. The book is extremely interesting as the author draws on historical examples dating from the Barbary Coast Pirates to Desert Storm.

Lehman lays the foundation for his book in the preface when he writes, "the Constitution is...not precise...setting up a permanent struggle between the branches and leaving events and politics to determine the rules."

Trained as a lawyer, Lehman looks at the specific areas in the Constitution dealing with presidential war powers. He then dissects the War Powers Act and the role it has played in recent U.S. military involvements. His conclusion is that, "Control of national security always ends up fought on political rather than constitutional or legal terrain."

Other interesting chapters involve congressional control of the purse, conflicts over treaty making, (in)ability of Congress to keep secrets, and the power of an inquisition. The congressional staff is now at a level equivalent to three Army divisions, and these staff members can generate enormous requests for informa-

tion (inquisition) which the executive branch and the military must answer.

Lehman's research is exceptional, and the footnotes provide many valuable resources. This book will benefit readers with an interest in the political aspects of America's military encounters and those who want an overview of executive branch and legislative branch infighting concerning the use of the military.

CPT Kendall T. Parks
Sierra Vista, AZ

Chinese Arms Transfers: Purpose, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order by R. Bates Gill (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 248 pages, \$45.

R. Bates Gill is on the faculty of the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In this study, he examines the People's Republic of China's (PRC) dealings in the arms bazaars of the world. The last authoritative study combining facts and figures on the arms trade and foreign policy of the PRC was **China and the Arms Trade**, published in 1985. This is a welcome addition to the body of knowledge on this subject.

Gill finished writing his book during the last days of the Bush presidency. For several months, the president had been spelling out his thoughts on the "New World Order." However, just how practical that world order would be depended on the actions of others. The PRC was a key player on the international scene, and the book's focus is the PRC's role in the arms bazaars.

Undoubtedly, the PRC continues to be a major supplier of arms. Gill makes it obvious Chinese leaders did not agree with America's policies in the past, and were not going to support Bush's concepts. The PRC used arms sales to manipulate nations in proximity to it—to offset the power of some and to dominate others.

The author examines these themes beginning with 1949. This is a well written, interesting book with just enough statistics to prove the point, but not enough to bore those who dislike numbers. The mix between facts about arms sales and interpretation of policy makes for easy reading. Through this book one can easily see that the decline of the former Soviet Union has not placed the U.S. in a dominant position. We share a world with other powers, and with countries that want to be powers, so the potential for conflict still exists. If teenage gangs have too many guns, the same can be said for nations and sophisticated weapon systems.

Peter Charles Unsinger
San Jose, CA



Not By the Book: A Combat Intelligence Officer in Vietnam by Eric McAllister Smith (New York: Ivy Books, 1993) 214 pages, \$5.

Every new lieutenant fresh from MIOBC will want to read Eric McAllister's *Not By the Book*. Writing about his experiences during the Vietnam War, Smith details the trials, tribulations, and learning curve involved in the making of a new intelligence officer. He illustrates vividly the differences between being a "green horn" and a seasoned combat veteran.

Smith is a graduate of Georgetown University's ROTC program. After being commissioned an MI officer in 1967, he attended nine months of Vietnamese language training before arriving in Vietnam. He served with the MI detachment at division headquarters, and a year later he was OIC of an MI team supporting a maneuver infantry brigade. Needless to say, he had become much wiser, more mature, and a successful, yet unorthodox, leader.

Smith eventually realized he could make a contribution not only as an interrogator and documents specialist but also as a leader. His group, of what he initially thought were misfits, turned out to be hardworking, productive MI interrogators and CI agents.

Smith was responsible for the lives of 12 other people in a combat zone. He gives the readers insights into his maturing as a man, officer, leader, and intelligence professional. He didn't always get what he wanted, and he didn't always make the right decisions, but he accomplished his assigned missions and took care of his troops. He did this with no loss of life, while he gathered and processed raw information into the "intelligence system." This information was produced into finished intelligence to be delivered to the combat commander.

Eric Smith remembered what leaders are trained to do: capture lessons learned and share them with the next generation of MI lieutenants. He offers his lessons learned at the end of the book; to find out what they are, go back and read it! For those new to MI, you get a glimpse of what life is like in a combat field environment as an MI officer. *Not By the Book* is definitely worth your time and investment.

MAJ Eric K. Naeseth, USAR
Annapolis, MD

The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns by Herman L. Gilster (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993) 138 pages, \$9.

Retired Air Force Colonel Herman L. Gilster is a West Point graduate who holds a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard. In *The Air War in Southeast Asia*, he takes an economic look at the effectiveness of U.S. air campaigns in Vietnam. This is not a "more bang for the buck" book, but rather a scholastic approach using specific case studies. It analyzes the economic impact of U.S. air campaigns on North Vietnam's military.

Did the Air Force impede the flow of supplies to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) enough to cause a serious hardship to their forces? Through studies of air power interdiction, close air support, and strategic bombardment, the author strongly asserts that it did not.

Studies of the Commando Hunt Campaigns leave room for further discussion as to their effectiveness, or lack thereof; but his numbers are there, and his argument is strong. The discussion of Linebacker 2, the bombing campaign on Hanoi, provides the author's best argument. In World War II, the allied bombing of Germany's manufacturing base significantly added to the Allies' choke hold on the Germans. However, in Vietnam, the bombing of Hanoi did not achieve the same result because the manufacturing base was minuscule. Hanoi was more important as a funnel of manufactured goods than as a manufacturer.

This book is a number cruncher's dream, and although any understanding of macroeconomics will be a benefit, it is not a prerequisite. There is, however, an abundant use of charts and tables, so be prepared. A personal library must have, maybe; a must read, definitely.

CPL Jeff Preuninger
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy 1917-1991 by R. Craig Nation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) 341 pages, \$23.

The author performs a valuable service by summarizing the sources and conduct of 74 years of Soviet "security policy"

(foreign policy). It is intriguing that the author presents a grandiose theme in his preface, in which he claims to be breaking fresh ground, and yet the book's value is in its clear, concise summaries of other authors' ideas—especially Soviet authors.

In the preface, Nation defines security in terms "compatible with traditional Soviet categories which encompass military, political, and socioeconomic dimensions." He shows that past histories of Soviet security have been flawed both because of the politicized view of writers (on all sides) and because of a methodology which ignores the connection between foreign policy, ideology, and internal dynamics within the Soviet Union. None of these claims is new, and perhaps it is only fitting that Nation chose to quote another author, Robert Legvold, when putting forth his own goal. In the end, it is clear that these concepts simply reduce themselves to a focus on foreign policy and the roles ideology and domestic issues play in the formulation of policy.

Nation's argument is simple: Soviet foreign policy was caught in a dilemma from its very inception between the revolutionary desire to be an international force for change and the traditional need for national security. The thesis is little more than the ideas put forward by the brilliant British historian E.H. Carr in 1937, and Nation dutifully gives credit to Carr. Nation traces this conflict through the Stalinist period when the Soviet dictator removed most (but not all) of the revolutionary internationalism from Soviet foreign policy.

In the last chapter, Nation points out that the Soviet foreign policy dilemma was not eliminated until Gorbachev was elected. He substituted interdependence for confrontation, and revolutionized his country's foreign policy. Nation gives credit to the eminent historian, Moshe Lewin, for these conclusions.

Although Nation may not have fresh ideas on Soviet policy, his book does provide a superbly concise summary of almost all of the major historical debates on Soviet security. For example, he condenses Carr's multi-volume views on Soviet policy to several insightful and unbiased pages. The footnotes on Soviet sources are an achievement. A note on the debate surrounding the Brest-Litovsk negotiations is a skillful enumeration of the traditional, Stalinist, and even the newest (1990) revisionist views on the issue.

Nation is both unbiased and thorough. He deals with all of the major historiographic controversies in an even-handed manner. In all of these issues, he focuses more on the interrelationship of domestic and foreign policies (as well as the international conditions as perceived by the Soviets) rather than on worn-out moralistic judgments of Soviet motives.

This book is clearly written for the strategic enthusiast and a scholarly audience. Nonetheless, I recommend it to MI officers with an interest in the Soviet Union. In only 340 pages, Nation provides a type of "textbook" which is a good overview of a complex topic.

CPT Curtis S. King
West Point, NY

The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II by David M. Glantz (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990) 262 pages, \$28.

The author wrote this book while he was chief of research with the Soviet Army Studies Office at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has outlined the intelligence activities of the Soviet forces in great detail. This book has much to say to MI professionals, in spite of the downfall of the Soviet empire.

The book outlines the Soviet Union's discovery of how *Razvedka*, or intelligence and reconnaissance was a combat multiplier against the Germans. Although the Soviets had previous experience in this area, World War II allowed them to combine the methods of "Razvedka" and win battles in 1944 and 1945. As the reader can imagine, it also shaped their perception of the importance of intelligence in their post-war operational plans.

The Soviets started the war handicapped by the "intuitions" of their leader Joseph Stalin. The author states that, "Stalin's...personal involvement and the dominance of his personality in strategic decision making...often interfered with objective judgment in all realms, including intelligence."

In the beginning of the war, the Soviets lacked talented analysts who could provide useful estimates from the large amount of data they received. It took the Soviets until November 1942 to organize a logical system at all command levels for *Razvedka*. Once they established the system, the Soviets realized that intelligence analysis had to prevail over Stalin's personal whim and strategic preconceptions.

After 1942, the Soviets established a group of interacting agencies and collection and analysis methods that are still in use today. The success of their efforts is illustrated by a 1943 report which states, "At Golovski Farm, we crushed a Rumanian division. The captured commander of this division [was shown] our intelligence map. The Rumanian division commander...said in amazement, 'The Soviet map reflects the positions of our forces more exactly than the operational map of my staff!'"

The Soviets improved their deception techniques from 1943 until the end of the war. The successful Kursk counteroffensive was credited to the fact that the Soviets deceived the Germans about their intentions and monitored German troop dispositions in operational and strategic depth.

By war's end, the Soviets had refined their procedures in a series of regulations, directives, and instructions. At the front, the GRU (Soviet Military Directorate) supervised intelligence staffs. They planned air, agent, radio, and troop intelligence operations. Here, the Soviets used special radio-troop battalions to conduct intercept and deception operations. To work with these battalions, they employed close reconnaissance teams that were inserted behind enemy lines to work with partisans.

Although the Soviet empire is gone, the lessons enumerated in this book are still applicable. MI professionals will be able to compare what was used by the

Soviets during World War II and what is used today as "accepted intelligence activities." Readers will find that the Soviets were pioneers in the use of intelligence, especially modern deception and intelligence across the operational depth of the battlefield.

MAJ Richard P. Ugino
Hilton, NY

Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade by Michael Masanduno (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) 360 pages, \$47.

This is the first definitive book about the Coordinating Committee's organization and operations. Commonly known as CoCom, this committee regulates the sales and transport of sensitive intelligence commodities to the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile countries.

The book asks the question, "Should Western governments permit the sale of advanced telecommunication systems to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?" The answer is comprehensive and thorough, requiring 300 pages to explore. Masanduno details the change of attitudes and policies within CoCom from the Cold War to the present. He reaches the conclusion that, as a result of diminished European fear of the Soviet Union, CoCom has not been, nor will it ever be, successful in controlling the international movement of sensitive technological items.

The text ably investigates Western Europe's exportation policies, as well as those of the U.S.. Written from the U.S. perspective, the book explores the effects of these exportations on our own security. The findings are highly provocative, carefully documented, and well supported. Although well written, some knowledge about international trade and foreign politics is helpful.

Although written in 1992, *Economic Containment* is not outdated. Masanduno's opinions are more relevant when juxtaposed against the demise of Soviet-style communism. He advises caution in the international trade of highly technological and security-sensitive items. This book is at the vanguard of American international security and should be in the libraries and minds of MI soldiers.

Lynn S. Beckham
Fort Hood, TX

Guerrillas: The Men and Women Fighting Today's Wars by Jon Lee Anderson (New York: Random House, 1992) 271 pages, \$22.

Jon Lee Anderson is a colorful, honest journalist. He became fascinated with the revolutionary mystique projected by the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara. He set out to discover what motivates such people.

At 30, Anderson visited and then lived for several weeks each with five guerrilla groups. He dodged bullets, caught infectious hepatitis, made contacts on both sides of the lines, and somehow survived with field notes intact. The guerrilla movements he writes about span the ideological gamut. They are El Salvador's pro-communist FMLN (Spanish abbreviation for Farabundo Marti Na-

tional Liberation Front), the anti-Soviet Mujaheddin Coalition in Afghanistan, the Karen Nationalist Guerrillas of Burma, the Polisario Movement of Western Sahara, and a combat group of the Palestinian intifada operating in Gaza.


The sections on the FMLN are the strongest. Anderson's material factually agrees with independent sources who observed all five movements. Topically organized, the book covers guerrilla psychology, war financing, political grievances, legal issues, and religious beliefs in slices that cut across each of the five movements.

It is apparent that Anderson has not been influenced by the tedious body of social science literature on guerrilla movements—his viewpoint is fresh. Guerrillas, he states, are the "world's last romantics"; they believe in their causes with an outrageous optimism that overshadows the misery of their circumstances. His book is the statement of the individual guerrilla warrior, the complement to Ann Ruth Willner and Dorothy Willner's classic essay "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" in Karl von Vorsy's *New Nations: The Problem of Political Development*.

Anderson concludes that the guerrilla mystique transcends ideology and culture. His book is filled with the smell of campfires and horse dung, the crack of rifles, and the screams of the wounded. As this reviewer concludes in his own multi-regional guerrilla warfare study, culture, not ideology, lights the psychological fires that drive guerrilla fighters. From within their apocalyptic vision they fight on for the Utopia that never quite materializes.

Russell W. Ramsey, Ph.D.
Fort Benning, GA





50 Years

303^d MI Battalion (OPNS)

Oriental blue and silver gray are the MI colors. A yellow-gold background with three oriental blue piles represents the mountains of Europe and Korea. The center pile bears an edelweiss, the national flower of Austria. The outer piles bear Korean signal beacons. The yellow-gold wreath of rice represents the unit's Vietnam service, and the four red flashes represent unit decorations earned there. The unit's motto, "Primi Noscere," means "First to Know."

The 303d MI Battalion is the most decorated MI battalion in the Army. Its heritage traces back to World War II. Its parent unit, the

3253d Signal Service Company, was activated on April 29, 1944, in England, with the mission to intercept German radio traffic.

In 1944, the company supported the XV Corps (U.S.), part of Patton's 3d Army, and saw action in France, Germany, and Austria. The 3253d earned battle streamers for action in five campaigns, and was inactivated in January 1946. On June 20, 1946, the company, now designated the 540th Signal Service Company, returned to Europe to support U.S. Forces in Austria. In 1949, the unit was again inactivated.

The unit's current designation first appeared on September 25, 1950, when the 303d Communications Reconnaissance Battalion was activated. The 303d's mission was to provide COMINT to U.S. Forces supporting the U.N. commitment to the Republic of Korea. In July 1951, the 540th Signal Service Company was absorbed into the 303d to preserve the 323d's and 540th's histories. The 303d continued to provide intelligence collection to U.N. Forces until the battalion's inactivation in Seoul, Korea, on June 25, 1955. The battalion was awarded eight additional campaign streamers, a U.S. Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.

As the 303d Army Security Agency (ASA) battalion, the unit returned to active duty at Camp Wolters, Texas, on June 15, 1962. It was at this time that native Texans who formed the initial 303d cadre adopted the unit nickname, "The Longhorn Battalion." In Vietnam, the 303d supported II Field Force and added 12 campaign streamers to its colors, 5 U.S. Meritorious Unit Commendations, and the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm and Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class.

After organizational changes, the battalion's companies were used to form the 312th and 522d MI Battalions. The 303d remained on active status and in 1978 was redesignated the 303d MI Battalion (Provisional) and assigned to the 504th MI Group. At the same time the 376th ASA Company and the 370th ASA Company were redesignated A and B Companies, 303d MI Battalion, respectively. On April 16, 1982, the 303d was fully activated as the 303d MI Battalion (CEWI) (Operations) (Corps), with the mission to provide IEW, especially COMINT, to III Corps (U.S.).

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